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CHEMICAL WARFARE: BATTLING
STEROIDS IN ATHLETICS
JIM THURSTON*
If I said that I could put the shot 90 feet with the aid of a sling or
two miles with a cannon, you would rightly tell me that I had missed
the point of the sport.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In a blistering 9.79 seconds, Ben Johnson shattered the world and
Olympic records in the 100-meter dash;2 he also shattered the myth. To
many, the exposure of Ben Johnson symbolized a powerful blow against
anabolic steroids;3 to others it signified the greatest advertisement contra-
dicting the myth.4 Prior to Johnson, the myth surrounding steroid use was
that only large, bulky, lethargic men and Eastern Bloc women used them.
Anabolic steroids would increase size and strength while decreasing agility
and speed. Although those within the steroid world knew this was inaccu-
rate, the public perception was that steroid use was limited to those sports
where size and strength were the essential prerequisites.
* B.A., Architecture, University of Pennsylvania, 1984; J.D., Marquette University Law
School, magna cum laude 1989; Special Student, Yale University Law School, 1988-89; associate,
Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago, Illinois. The author participated in the National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association and earned six varsity letters in both football and baseball while attending the
University of Pennsylvania. Special acknowledgement is extended to Professor Stanton Wheeler,
Yale University Law School, and to my parents, David and Frances Thurston, for their editorial
assistance and comments.
1. Murray, Get On With Sports, Leave Steroids Behind, 12(3) PHYSICIANS SPORTSMEDICINE,
187 (1984).
2. See Benjamin, Shame of the Games, TIME, Oct. 10, 1988, at 74. Johnson's time of 9.79 in
the 100 meter dash eclipsed his own previous world record of 9.83, which he set in the 1987 World
Championships in Rome. Johnson also surpassed Jim Hines' Olympic record of 9.95 set during
the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games. However, after it was discovered that Johnson used ana-
bolic steroids, he was stripped of his world record and gold medal.
3. See Vecsey, Johnson's Ban A Lifesaver, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1988, at D-32, col. 5.
4. See Kaufman, Rise in Steroid Use Seen as Side Effect, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1988, at B-18,
col. 5. Dr. James Garrick, a San Francisco sports medicine specialist, foresees the Ben Johnson
incident increasing, not decreasing, the use of steroids by athletes. "I can't think of a better
advertisement for anabolic steroids... [it] opens a whole new facet for steroid use." Id. Bob
Goldman, chief physician and chairman of the drug testing committee of the International Feder-
ation of Body Builders concurs: "Since the Ben Johnson episode, kids are coming into the gym
asking for steroids because they want to run faster." See Penn, Muscling In, As Ever More People
Try Anabolic Steroids Traffickers Take Over, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1988, at A-l, col. 1.
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In recent years, the use of steroids has reached epidemic levels in many
sporting arenas.5 Many athletes believe that taking anabolic steroids will
enhance their performances,6 and regard the use of steriods as legitimate as
any other aspect of training. However, to the medical community, athletes
are making a Faustian bargain with steroids. Physicians and researchers
have expressed concerns over the potential risks attributed to steroid use.7
To some medical organizations, the illicit use of steroids to enhance athletic
performance is the most haphazard and questionable medical "experiment"
in modem times.'
Despite the medical evidence that the introduction of steroids into one's
biological system has potentially harmful effects, some athletes believe they
should be allowed to take any substances which might improve their per-
formance.9 Athletes understand and accept the risks associated with these
drugs in exchange for the benefits they hope to obtain.10 Athletes, like any
other members of society, have legitimate expectations of privacy and
should not be arbitrarily singled out and subjected to drug testing, particu-
larly since steroids affect only the user and do not threaten the health and
safety of others." Society does not prevent people from smoking cigarettes
despite the fact that the surgeon general has warned that smoking is both
addictive and hazardous to an individual's health. And like cigarettes,
neither state nor federal laws prohibit the use of steroids. 2
5. See Bergman & Leach, The Use and Abuse of Anabolic Steroids in Olympic-Caliber Ath-
letes, CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS, Sept. 1985, 169-72; Haupte & Rovere, Anabolic Steroids: A Re-
view of the Literature, 12 AM. J. SPORTS MED.; see also infra notes 18, 41, and 61.
6. See infra notes 43-60 and accompanying text for an evaluation of the medical literature.
7. See infra notes 87-106 and accompanying text.
8. See, eg., Schmeck, Concern Rises Over Steroids, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1987, at D-26, col.
2. The American College of Sports Medicine deplores the use of steroids in sports and has issued
a recent statement that steroids can have adverse psychological effects as well as physical effects.
9. See, e.g., Courson, Steroids. Another View, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, November 14, 1988, at
106. The author, Steve Courson, a former NFL lineman, argues that steroids cannot be elimi-
nated from football, and questions why steroids are treated any differently than painkillers or
sleeping pills. Courson suggests that athletes should be allowed to take steroids and have their
systems monitored by physicians for possible ill effects. See also Johnson, Special Report: Getting
Physical - And Chemical, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 13, 1985, at 38.
10. See Courson, supra note 9.
11. This article, however, disputes the claim that steroids only affect the user. See infra notes
396-99 and accompanying text.
12. See Springer, NCAA Attempts to Defuse Bomb Called Steroids, L.A. Times, January 4,
1987, Sec. 3, at 18, col. I (Valley ed.). On October 5, 1989, Congressmen Mel Levine and Henry
Waxman of California and Ben Gilman of New York introduced a bill that would declare steroids
a controlled substance, and illegal possession would carry a maximum 20-year prison sentence.
H.R. 3421, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
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Ethically, the use of steroids raises serious questions as to what consti-
tutes healthy competition. The introduction of performance-enhancing
drugs has threatened both the integrity of the Olympic Games, and profes-
sional sports in general. 13 The ethical argument maintains that competition
should be honorable, and that the taking of steroids is both cheating and a
contradiction to the meaning of sport. However, the ethical argument
based on the concept of fair play is unpersuasive to the individual who is
motivated to win at any physical cost. Further, the enormous potential
monetary benefits and celebrity status associated with winning an Olympic
medal14 or playing at the professional level,' 5 outweigh any ethical ques-
tions. To other athletes, it is not even an ethical question; it is a simple
matter of survival. Since the competition is using steroids, so must they in
order to remain competitive.
The reality is that most sports associations take a hypocritical approach
to steroids: they publically denounce steroid use, yet readily offer contracts
to superior athletes who use them. 6 The reason for the casual attitude to-
13. See, eg., Janofsky, Citing Drug Use, Olympic Officials Propose a Ban on Weight Lifting,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1988, at A-1, col. 2. After a fourth weight lifter was disqualified in the 1988
Seoul Olympics, the International Olympic Committee vice-president, Richard Pound, stated:
"Now may be the time to give weight lifting an Olympic holiday. There certainly seems to be a
problem. Maybe we can take the sport to task, that until they clean themselves up, they can't get
back into the Games. It would certainly be a lesson for other sports." Id. See also Deford,
Olympian Changes; Politics and Money are Dead Issues, Drugs and New Sports Aren't, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, October 10, 1988, at 126.
14. See, ,,g., Janofsky & Alfano, Victory at Any Cost: Drug Pressure Growing, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 21, 1988, at A-I, col. 1. The amount of money that Olympic stars, particularly track stars,
can receive has significantly raised the risks that athletes are willing to take. It was reported that
Ben Johnson lost about $2,800,000 in endorsements from a single manufacturer of Italian sports-
wear. Kaufman, supra note 4, at B-18. Johnson's total losses from endorsement contracts are
estimated to be between ten and fifteen million dollars. These companies drafted contracts that
included escape clauses in the event he was found to be using steroids. See Axthelm, The Doped-
Up Games, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 10, 1988, at 56. In addition to the lucrative endorsement contracts,
after breaking the world record in the 100 meter dash in the 1987 Rome World Championships,
Johnson began collecting appearance fees that averaged $30,000 for each track meet he attended.
Johnson also received $250,000 for a single race against his rival, Carl Lewis, in Zurich. Id.
15. The average Major League Baseball salary in 1970 was $29,303 per year. In 1980, the
average rose to $130,592. See SLOAN, THE ATHLETE & THE LAw, 73 (1983). In 1990, a profes-
sional baseball player's average salary has escalated to an estimated $600,000. See Gammons,
1950 v 1990. A Tale of Two Eras, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, April 16, 1990, at 43. As John
Lombardo, physician at the Cleveland Clinic, stated: "A potential professional football player
who is more than six feet tall and weighs 210 lbs. might not make it [to the pro ranks], whereas if
he were stronger and weighed 240 lbs, he might make $200,000 a year. As long as they're in that
type of situation, they'll continue to use steroids." See Cowart, infra note 110, at 3025.
16. See, e-g., Cowboys Eye Johnson, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1988, at A-21, col. 5. Within days
after Ben Johnson was stripped of his gold medal in the Seoul Olympic Games, the Dallas Cow-
boys of the National Football League contacted Johnson's agent and indicated that they would be
willing to sign Johnson. The fact that Johnson tested positive for anabolic steroids, a substance
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wards steriod use by team owners is that unlike street drugs, which may
adversely affect a player's performance, anabolic steroids improve their per-
formance."7 Unfortunately, this see-no-evil attitude sets a poor example,
particularly for our young athletes.18
Recently, the Soviet Union and the United States signed a bilateral
agreement for twice-a-year random testing of the elite athletes of each coun-
try while these athletes are training. 19 This is the first international agree-
ment on mandatory random testing, and it is a major achievement for
combating drug use.20 As one international athlete stated, present drug
testing procedures are analogous to a speed trap of which everyone in town
knows.21 Many of these athletes "speed" until they approach the known
danger zone, at which time they simply slow down to avoid apprehension.
This rationale explains why many athletes believe only the stupid or care-
less get caught; those who press a little too hard on the accelerator or slow
down a little too late. Thus, it is time to start catching the "smart" athletes,
too.
that has been publically denounced by the N.F.L., apparently did not diminish the Cowboy's
interest in signing him. As stated by Abby Hoffman, the general director of Sports Canada:
"Either we decide to seriously deal with [steroid] drugs in sports or we turn a blind eye and carry
on with the hypocrisy." See Vecsey, supra note 3, at D-32, col. 6.
17. See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
18. Dr. James Puffer, chief of the division of family medicine at the University of California-
Los Angeles School of Medicine and the chief physician of the United States Olympic team in the
1988 Summer Games states: "[Miany of us have been quite alarmed by the increasing number of
high school and junior high school athletes that were seen experimenting with these substances
[anabolic steroids].... It has become frightening." See Schmeck, supra note 8; see also Charlier,
Among Teen-Agers, Abuse of Steroids May Be Bigger Issue Than Cocaine Use, Wall St. J., Oct. 4,
1988, at A-20, col. 1. The article reports that one study places at 7% the number of American
high school males who have taken or are taking steroids. Id. William Buckley, an assistant pro-
fessor of physical education at Penn State University, conducted a study for the Journal of Ameri-
can Medical Association that found that 6.6% of the male high school seniors-or as many as
500,000 nationwide-use or have used anabolic steroids and that more than two-thirds of them
first tried steroids when they were sixteen or younger. Buckley further found that this is not
casual use, but that the young athletes are "stacking the drugs," see supra note 74, and some 30%
were using needles, see supra note 77. Scorecard, Steroids and the Young, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
December 26, 1988, at 21. However, the use of anabolic steroids varies from school to school,
region to region. One Florida high school conducted a non-scientific survey that revealed 18% of
the male student body responding had taken the drug. See Ingwerson, Steroids Use Reaching
Beyond 'Pros' to High School Students, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 13, 1987, at 1, ol. 1.
These statistics are particularly alarming considering that in 1986, the number of high school
students who played football was 953,506. See Lapchick, The High School Athlete and the Future
College Student-Athlete, J. SPORT & SOCIAL ISSUES, 106 (1988).
19. See Janofsky, US. and Soviet Union Approve Plan on Drug Testing of Athletes, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 22, 1988, at A-l, col. 5.
20. Id.
21. See Moses, An Athlete's Rxfor the Drug Problem, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 10, 1988, at 57.
STEROIDS IN ATHLETICS
This article will first trace the origins of steroid use and examine why
and how athletes use steroids and where they obtain them. It will then
examine the recent medical literature to determine the positive and negative
effects of anabolic steroids on the human body, and why present testing
procedures are ineffective in detecting and deterring steroid use. Next, it
will evaluate recent decisions in the courts to determine whether a plan for
random testing could withstand the various constitutional challenges.
Based upon these conclusions, this article will offer a proposed plan for the
elimination of steroids from our arenas and playing fields.
II. ANABOLIC STEROIDS AND THEIR EFFECT ON ATHLETES
A. The History of Steroids
The mythical Herculean qualities associated with steroid use arose in
the nineteenth century. A European physiologist injected himself with tes-
tosterone, which was extracted from a rooster's testicles, and claimed an
enhancement of his virility. 22 Testosterone, the male sex hormone, was first
isolated in the twentieth century in experiments conducted by Kochakian
and Murlin.23 In 1935, they recognized the potential anabolic effect of pro-
moting tissue growth after injecting testosterone into castrated dogs.24
These dogs demonstrated a decreased protein breakdown and achieved a
positive nitrogen balance.25 The first clinical use of testosterone occurred in
1938 when physicians injected it into underweight and systemically ill pa-
tients to stimulate weight gain. 26 The hormone also was used as a weight
gain stimulus for the survivors of the German concentration camps.27
The first reported use of steroids in a non-medical setting occurred dur-
ing World War II. Steroids were administered by Nazi doctors into Ger-
22. See Pine, Myth Surrounding Steroids Began In 19th Century Europe, Reuters N. Am.
Serv., Sept. 28, 1988. Other early experiments with testosterone included Berthold, in 1849, cas-
trating immature roosters and observing the failure of development of typical male characteristics.
In a related experiment, Berthold reimplanted the removed testes into the peritoneal cavity and
observed normal development. See Stone & Lipner, The Use of Anabolic Steroids in Athletes, J.
DRUG ISSUES, 351-59 (1980).
23. See Mellion, Anabolic Steroids in Athletes, AM.-FAMILY PHYSICIAN, July 1984, at 114.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The best known legitimate use of anabolic steroids in medicine is to treat extremely
serious cases of anemia. Anabolic steroids often can stimulate the bone marrow which is the part
of the body where most of the red and white blood cells originate. Anabolic steroids can also help
elderly women who suffer osteoporosis and younger children with growth problems.
1990]
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man soldiers to enhance their aggressiveness.2" The Soviet Union noted the
Nazis' use of the drug and recognized that enhanced aggressiveness could
be desirable in athletic competition.2 9 The Soviets experimented with ster-
oids in the early 1950s, and it is believed that they were used in the 1952
Helsinki Olympic Games.30
The introduction of steroids in the United States is often attributed to
the late Dr. John Ziegler, the team physician for the United States weight-
lifters at the 1954 Vienna World Powerlifting Championships. 31 A Soviet
physician disclosed to Ziegler that some of the members of the Soviet team
were using testosterone as an erogenic aid to enhance their strength.32 Zie-
gler was significantly impressed with the results and began conducting some
case studies on American lifters. The result was the development and intro-
duction of Dianabol, an anabolic steroid with fewer masculinizing proper-
ties than testosterone.3 3 Dianabol became well known in the athletic
arenas. By the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games, steroid use had escalated
to the point that many Olympians in strength events were either using
them, or were aware of their performance enhancing abilities.34
At their inception, steroids were used almost exclusively by weightlifters
and throwers in track and field. Athletes in other events feared large, hulk-
ing muscles would make them lethargic and less agile.3 5 Steroid use was
limited particularly to those events that required short, explosive muscle
power, but not endurance or speed.36
However, as more athletes began to experiment with steroids, the lethar-
gic, non-endurance myth began to erode. By the mid-1960s, the first exami-
nations for steroids were conducted in Belgium at an international
competition in cycling.37 By 1968, the International Olympic Committee
(1OC) medical commission established a list of banned substances and in-
troduced its first Olympic drug testing program at the 1968 Mexico City
28. See Cowart, Steroids in Sports After Four Decades, Time to Return These Genies to Bot-
te?, 257 J. A.M.A. 423 (1987); see also Benjamin, supra note 2, at 76; Haupt & Rovere, supra note
5, at 469.
29. Id.
30. See Bergman & Leach, supra note 5, at 170.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Ziegler later was quoted as saying that he would like to take that chapter out of his
life because he did not realize the obsessive personalities of athletes, particularly weightlifters, and
that this was an unhealthy combination since they ignored recommended doses. If one pill at-
tained certain results, imagine what three or four would do. See Cowart, supra note 28, at 423.
34. Id.
35. See, eg., Haupt & Rovere, supra note 5, at 469-84.
36. See Bergman & Leach supra note 5, at 171.
37. See Mellion, supra note 23, at 115.
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Olympic Games.3 8 Anabolic steroids were not included on the list because
no laboratory method was sophisticated enough or accurate enough to de-
tect them routinely.3 9 It was not until the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games
that technology was advanced enough to detect anabolic steroids in a urine
sample.40
Steroid use has not been limited to the amateur athletic arenas. Their
use has spread into the professional ranks, particularly in football.4" Ster-
oids are custom-made for football players because they give them added size
and increased aggressiveness. There is no consensus regarding when or by
whom steroids were first introduced into professional football, but today
many players believe it is the most abused drug in the National Football
League (NFL).42
B. The Physical Effect of Steroids on the Athlete
The two major classifications of steroids are anabolic and corticol.43
Corticosteroids became widely available after cortisone, a steroid with anti-
inflammatory properties, was first synthetically manufactured in 1948.4
Corticosteroids are used to treat a number of disorders, including arthritis
and inflammatory injuries.45 Many athletes have had injections of cortico-
steroids to reduce the inflammation resulting from an injury.46 Unlike ana-
bolic steroids, corticosteroids are not used to promote muscle growth.
Anabolic steroids are derivatives of the male sex hormone testoster-
one.47 Anabolic steroids were developed in an attempt to dissociate the
androgenic, or masculinizing effects of testoterone use from the anabolic
effects.4" The term "anabolic" means "constructive metabolism," implying
38. Id.
39. See Altman, New Olympic Drug Test Foiled Sprinter, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1988, at C-3,
col. 3.
40. See Mellion, supra note 23, at 115.
41. See, e.g., Johnson, Special Report: Steroids A Problem Of Huge Dimensions, SPORTS IL-
LUSTRATED, May 13, 1985, at 38-61.
42. Id.
43. See Cowart, Athletes and Steroids: The Bad Bargain, SAT. EVE. POsT, April 1987, at 56-
59.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Haupt & Revere, supra note 5, at 469.
48. Id. One of the secondary sex characteristics of males, distinguishing them from females,
is a relatively large muscle mass. The "anabolic effect" or tissue building effect of testosterone is
largely responsible for the disparity in muscle mass between men and women. The "androgenic
effect" of testosterone is responsible for the maintenance of growth of the primary male sex char-
acteristics. However, even today, no synthetic steroid has been able to completely separate the
anabolic from androgenic effect in steroids. See Stone & Lipner, supra note 22.
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that these substances promote the construction of tissue.49 Unlike cortico-
steroids, anabolic steroids are not used legitimately for the treatment of
injuries.5"
Athletes take anabolic steroids to enhance and maximize athletic per-
formance. Three major benefits are attributed to steroid use. First, athletes
can attain a greater increase in lean muscle mass and strength when ana-
bolic steroids are used in combination with rigorous training than could be
expected from strenuous training alone."1 Specifically, anabolic steroids
promote the synthesis of protein in the skeletal muscle cells by promoting
nitrogen retention and perhaps by increasing ribonucleic acid synthesis.52
Steroids reverse the catabolic effects of glucocorticosteroids that are re-
leased by individuals during periods of significant stress, such as athletic
training or competition. 3 This results in increased muscle growth and
muscle mass, which is beneficial to athletic performance, particularly in
those events that require explosive muscle power.54
The second major benefit of steroid use is that athletes taking anabolic
steroids experience a state of euphoria and diminished fatigue following
heavy weight training or running workouts, and the athletes' bodies suffer
less muscle breakdown. 5 This decrease in muscle breakdown and recovery
time permits more frequent training sessions at higher intensity and for
longer periods of time.56 This effect is maintained as long as the athlete
continues the steroid regimen.5
The third benefit is that many athletes take steroids because of the in-
creased aggressiveness these drugs are believed to stimulate.5" Normal psy-
49. See Strauss, Anabolic Steroids, CLINICS IN SPORTS MED., July 1984, 743-48.
50. The outspoken Seattle Seahawks linebacker, Brian Bosworth, formerly of the Oklahoma
Sooners, was suspended from participating in the 1987 Orange Bowl for testing positive for ana-
bolic steroids. Bosworth, like other athletes caught using anabolic steroids, claimed that they
were used for treatment of a shoulder injury. Dr. Bentran Zarins, a Harvard Medical School
orthopedic surgeon and team physician for the New England Patriots and the Boston Bruins
stated that anabolic steroids are not, and never have been, used to treat injuries. "I have never
done it or seen it done." He stated further: "I doubt they confuse the two. I think most people
who take anabolic steroids know what they are taking." See Cowart, supra note 28, at 421. Re-
porters for SPORTS ILLUSTRATED interviewed several NFL team doctors, and none of them could
think of a valid medical reason for giving anabolic steroids to a player. See Johnson, supra note 41,
at 42.
51. See Mellion, supra note 23, at 115.
52. See Bergman & Leach, supra note 5, at 171.
53. See Haupt & Rovere, supra note 5, at 474.
54. See, e.g., Lamb, infra note 74.
55. See Bergman & Leach, supra note 5, at 171.
56. Id.
57. See Lamb, infra note 74, at 474-75.
58. See Mellion, supra note 23, at 115.
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chological behavior becomes "polarized," resulting in a more hostile,
aggressive and assertive nature. 9 This increased aggressiveness may drive
athletes to train harder and longer without the usual fatigue. For some of
the heavier users, the effects do not necessarily go away as soon as the com-
petition is over."
C Why Athletes Take Steroids
Many professional, collegiate and high school athletes are engaged in
one of the largest, and perhaps most lethal, experiments when they intro-
duce anabolic steroids into their systems. The use of steroids by athletes in
the United States has been estimated as high as one million persons, or one
in every two hundred fifty people.6"
Sports have evolved from a recreational pastime to a lucrative money-
making venture, not only at the professional level, but also at the Olympic
and collegiate levels. Speed and strength have opened the door to financial
opportunities, and a perplexing marriage has been forged between sports
and steroids. The concept of sports as a fun, recreational activity has been
superseded by sports as a business.
Many athletes will sell their bodies to steroids for an opportunity to win
a gold medal or a place on a professional or college team. Some of these
athletes stand on the verge of fame and fortune, and if they can obtain even
the slightest edge on their competition through the use of anabolic steroids,
they care little if it is outlawed in international or intercollegiate competi-
tion. To the elite athlete, these small, incremental increases in muscular
performance may constitute the difference between winning and losing, and
these changes may be perceived as critical to the athlete. Since the intro-
duction of steroids to sports, the reason for steroid use has remained the
same: the pursuit of the winning edge.
It is clear from the testimonial evidence that athletes have the potential
to engage in extreme behavior if they believe they can achieve this winning
59. See Cowart, supra note 28, at 421.
60. See Schmeck, supra note 8. For an example of the devastating effects of steroids see
Chaikin & Telander, infra note 62.
61. See Telander, A Peril For Athletes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 24, 1988, at 114. Dr.
Forest Tennant, a California researcher estimates "as many as one million athletes," or one in
every 250 persons in the U.S. are using anabolic steroids. See Benjamin, supra note 2, at 76. Terry
Todd, a physical education teacher, told the California State Assembly that two to three million
persons, athletes and non-athletes, are using anabolic steroids. See Millions of Americans Take
Steroid.% Says Professor, Reuters N. Am Serv., Aug. 13, 1985.
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edge.62 The amount of money that Olympic stars and professional athletes
can now receive has raised the risks athletes are willing to take.63
For other elite athletes, there is no choice. Many athletes do not want
to use steroids, but they concede that they must because they believe other
athletes on competing teams are using them."4 Some athletes feel compelled
to experiment with anabolic steroids so they can become the best al this
elite level of competition. As stated by a New York Jet rookie offensive
tackle:
I played against a lot of guys that I know for a fact were using ster-
oids. I saw them one year, the next year they came back 15 pounds
heavier, stronger and they looked different. They played better and
hit harder. That was one piece of the pie in my decision. I will do
anything to become the best lineman in the N.F.L.65
For many, however, it is not a matter of being the best; rather it is
simply a matter of survival. "It's big in the USFL [United States Football
League, now defunct] because if you don't make it here, you're thrown
right out into the real world."66
For those engaged in sports, society's emphasis on athletics has changed
from fair play and participation to winning and competition. Many athletes
feel that they are under tremendous pressure to do anything to win.6 This
emphasis on win at all costs is evident not only at the elite levels of competi-
tion, but has descended to the high school students and even younger. 6
62. See, e.g., Chaikin & Telander, The Nightmare of Steroids, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 24,
1988, at 82-102. The article recounts the horrifying exploits of a steroid using collegiate football
player, Tommy Chaikin. Chaikin attributes much of his off-the-field aggressiveness to steroids,
which included many fights, and even pulling a loaded shotgun on a boy delivering pizza because
in Chaikin's enraged steroid state, he believed it was funny. Chaikin's nightmare culminated one
night when he sat on his bed with a loaded .357 magnum revolver pressed under his chin, fortu-
nately he was interrupted before he could pull the trigger.
63. See supra notes 14 and 15.
64. For many United States Olympic athletes, there is a feeling that the Eastern Bloc coun-
tries have been successful in masking their athletes' steroid use. These athletes believe if they do
not also take steroids they will be placed at a physical disadvantage. See Bergman & Leach, supra
note 5, at 172. For example, a former world champion ski jumper Hans-Georg Aschenbach, and
former sport official Juergen Noczenski, both from East Germany claim that all of the elite sports
stars from East Germany are required to use steroids. Noczenski and Aschenback stated that
those who did not use steroids were forced out of the national squad, and two recent 1988
Olympic champions, skater Katarina Witt and swimmer Kristin Otto, are among those who regu-
larly used steroids. Neither Witt or Otto have ever tested positive for steroids. See East German
Athletes' Steroid Use Told, The Chicago Tribune, June 28, 1989, sec. 4, at 9.
65. See, e.g., Rhoden, Ideas & Trends: Varying Standards on Steroid Use, N.Y. Times, Octo-
ber 2, 1988, D-9, col. 1.
66. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 43.
67. See Mellion, supra note 23, at 113.
68. See Schmeck, supra note 8.
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Many teen athletes see the best and the biggest athletes using steroids at
all levels of competition, and these athletes become their role models. Any-
thing that their role models use becomes acceptable as just another risk of
the game. If using steroids is all right for the guy scoring touchdowns on
television, it must be all right for them. Ironically, while these young ath-
letes use steroids to increase their size and strength, they actually are arrest-
ing the natural growth processes of their bodies.6 9
D. "Pyramiding" and "Stacking':" The Athletes' Dosage
Part of the problem in determining the true effects of steroids on the
human body is the ethical "Catch-22" that confronts many doctors.
Although researchers and medical organizations have a pronounced inter-
est in determining the effects of steroids, the dosages used by the elite ath-
letes is often one hundred times the therapeutic dose.7 0 Such dosages given
to a controlled study group would breach the margin of safety, and could
expose the participants to potentially dangerous health risks.71 The amount
used by the athletes far exceeds the amount that any physician could ethi-
cally administer to a controlled study group. 2 This lack of conclusive med-
ical data has undercut the medical community's warnings and credibility
with the athletes. 3
In order to maximize the anabolic effect of steroids while minimizing
the likelihood of detection, many athletes have developed so-called "stack-
ing'1 74 and "pyramiding"75 regimens of drug administration. These two
procedures progressively increase both the dose and types of steroid to
achieve the optimal anabolic effect. Athletes generally use anabolic steroids
in a cyclical manner;76 they inject 77 or ingest 78 the drugs for periods of four
69. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
70. See Bergman & Leach, supra note 5, at 171; see also Pope & Katz, infra note 101, at 490.
71. See Strauss, supra note 49, at 745.
72. See Bergman & Leach, supra note 5, at 171.
73. See, eg., Janofsky & Alfano, supra note 14 at A-1, col. 1; see also Courson, supra note 9,
at 106. As one professional athlete noted: "It is time to get realistic about steroids. A decade ago
the American College of Sports Medicine lost credibility with athletes when it stated that anabolic
steroids do not enhance performance, a position it didn't reverse until recently.... So why would
they listen when the medical community cautioned about steroids deleterious side effects?" Id.
74. See, e.g., Lamb, Anabolic Steroids in Athletics: How Well Do They Work and How Danger-
ous Are They?, 12 AM. J.SPORTS MED. 33; see also infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Letter, Use of Androgenic Anabolic Steroids by Athletes, J. A.M.A., July 27,
1984, at 482, col. 1; see also infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
76. Id.
77. Steroids, unlike certain street drugs like heroin, are not injected into veins. Rather, ster-
oids are injected deep into a muscle, usually the gluteal muscles. The drug then disperses
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to eighteen weeks and then have "drug holidays," ranging from one month
to a year before starting another cycle.7 9
"Pyramiding" occurs when the athlete starts with a low dosage level at
the beginning of each cycle,8" then each week the dosage is increased until
the athlete hits the apex of the "pyramid." Once this highest point is
reached, a progressive decrease in the amount of drug ensues to minimize
the risk of detection while retaining the maximum benefits. The scheduling
and amount of intake are directly related to the testing date.81 Generally,
no drugs are used during the final week before competition or testing.82
"Stacking" involves the use of one steroid agent taken in conjunction
with another. 83 For example, while the athlete receives a weekly steroid
injection, an oral steroid tablet might be "stacked on top" of the other
drugs. Many athletes engage in combinations of these practices like "stack-
ing the pyramid" where high doses of three, four or even five different ster-
oid agents are taken simultaneously. 4
Due to the limits on controlled study groups, it is not possible to state
with any certainty the adverse effects that will result from the long-term
practice of ingesting massive doses of anabolic steroids. These side effects
throughout the body. The injectables have become more popular than the orals in recent years
because they are administered less frequently. See Lamb, supra note 74, at 32.
78. Oral steroids are favored because they are more difficult to detect than the injectables, yet
they are disfavored because they are more toxic to the liver. See Haupt & Rovere, supra note 5, at
477.
79. See Letter, supra note 75.
80. Id.
81. See Lamb, supra note 74, at 33. Ben Johnson ran a world record time of 9.83 in the 100-
meter dash at the 1987 World Championships in Rome, and he passed the post-race drug test.
However, in June 1989, Johnson testified before a Canadian government inquiry that he was on a
steroid program leading up to the 1987 championships, yet he passed the drug testing by arrang-
ing his drug cycle so that the steroids he used would clear out of his system by the testing date.
See Hersh, Johnson's World Marks Likely to be Erased, The Chicago Tribune, September 5, 1989,
sec. 4, at 2, col. 3. In fact, it was reported by Canadian officials that Johnson was tested after
various track meets a total of eight times during an eighteen month stretch prior to the 1988 Seoul
Olympic Games, yet at no time did he test positive for drugs. See Atkin, Johnon Disqualification
Spotlights Drug Problem, Christian Science Monitor, September 28, 1988, at 18, col. 1; see also
Janofsky, Steroid Testimony: What Effect, N.Y. Times, March 5, 1989, sec. 8, at 1, col. 2. The
article states that doctors famililar with steroids and other performance enhancing drugs know
how long they remain in the athlete's system, which is essential to the athlete in order to avoid
testing positive after competition. Id,
82. See Lamb, supra note 74, at 33.
83. Id.
84. See Letter, supra note 75. The practice of "stacking" derives from the athletes' belief that
if one pill or a certain size dosage could give them good results, two, three or four pills or a larger
dosage would give them better results. See Chaikin & Telander, supra note 62, at 94; see also
Courson, supra note 9, at 54.
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may not be realized for another decade. 5 It is the belief of one prominent
physician that "young athletes who take heavy doses of anabolic steroids
for [sixty] to [ninety] days should expect to die in their [thirties] or
[forties]." 8 6
E. The Side Effects of Steroids
Anabolic steroids have a number of potentially harmful side effects that
can be classified into three user groups: adult males, adult females and pre-
adults. In the adult male, the introduction of synthetic hormones results in
decreased levels of follicle stimulating hormones (FSH) and luteinizing hor-
mones (LN).8 : This can result in a decreased production of sperm and tes-
tosterone by the testes, which can lead to atrophy of the testes.88 Increased
incidence of liver tumors and abnormal liver functions have been noted in
patients using anabolic steroids, 9 particularly oral steroids.' Liver, pros-
tate and testicular cancer have been linked to steroid use.91 Acne is com-
monly exacerbated, baldness is accelerated, and a decrease in high density
lipoproteins (HDL) cholesterol is noted in steroid athletes, suggesting in-
creased cardiovascular risks.92 There have been several deaths linked to
steroid use, including one reported case of Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS).93
In adult women, severe masculinizing effects have been documented, in-
cluding hair growth on the chin and cheeks, male-pattern baldness, deepen-
ing of the voice, shrinkage of breast size, enlargement of the clitoris, uterine
atrophy and menstrual irregularities.94 Steroids used by pregnant women
can inhibit the development of the female embryo, and cause
85. See Janofsky & Alfano, supra note 73. The medical community has expressed concern
about the potential effects of steroids that may not be realized for a few decades, which will be too
late for many athletes. As Dr. Burt Evans stated: "I shudder to think of some of the things I
condoned 40 years ago. Now we are paying the price in pain for our ignorance of that long ago. I
hope it's not the same case with steroids." Id.
86. See Benjamin, supra note 2, at 77.
87. See Strauss, supra note 49, at 745.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Lamb, supra note 74, at 32, 35.
91. See Benjamin, supra note 2, at 77.
92. See Strauss, supra note 49, at 745.
93. See Letter, AIDS in a Bodybuilder Using Anabolic Steroids, NEw ENG. J. MED., Dec. 27,
1984, at 1701. As part of a bodybuilding program, the patient had been injecting anabolic steroids
on a weekly basis with needles that were often shared with other bodybuilders.
94. See Lamb, supra note 74, at 36.
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pseudohermaphroditism or even the death of the fetus.95 Like their male
counterparts, steroid use by females has been linked to several deaths.96
In pre-adults, anabolic steroids can cause the premature closure of the
bone growth plates resulting in a shorter stature.97 Ironically, high school
athletes believe steroids will increase their size and enhance their ability to
obtain an athletic scholarship. However, the reality is that steroids will
stunt their natural growth process and could potentially be more damaging
than beneficial to obtaining a collegiate scholarship.98
The other major side effect includes what has been popularly called
"roid rage." 99 As noted earlier, for training and competition purposes the
increased aggressiveness has been classified as a benefit of steroid use."c°
However, once out of the arena, "roid rage," or the increased aggressive-
ness, is an adverse side effect. Wild aggression and paranoid delusions are
common in some steroid users.1"1 Denoted by the medical community as a
"pseudo-Alzheimer's type dementia," steroid use can lead to episodes of
increased aggressiveness and spontaneous violence." 2 A recent Harvard
95. Id. at 35.
96. See, e.g., An Athlete Dying Young, TIME, Oct. 10, 1988, at 77. Birgit Dressel, a West
German heptathlete, died an agonizing death at the age of 26, due to a massive allergic reaction to
numerous drugs she ingested. Id.
97. See Haupt & Rovere, supra note 5, at 480.
98. Even Steve Coursin, former NFL lineman, and advocate of allowing athletes to use ana-
bolic steroids, does not believe it is wise for teenagers to use them. "I never recommend steroids
to high school kids. I tell them they're too young. I say wait until you get everything you can
from your body, naturally." See Johnson, supra note 41, at 50. Keith Wheeler, a biochemist at
Ross Laboratories in Columbus, Ohio, would agree with Coursin's advice. "You may have a kid
who's genetically gifted to be 6-foot-5 and 235 pounds, but with steroids you may end up with a 5-
foot-10 obese teen on your hands." See Charlier, supra note 18. Although a rather extreme exam-
ple, most medical researchers would agree with Wheeler that anabolic steroids can harm a teen-
ager's natural genetic structure. See Haupt & Rovere, supra note 5, at 480; see also Strauss, supra
note 49, at 744.
99. See Benjamin, supra note 2, at 77.
100. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Pope & Katz, Effective and Psychotic Associated With Anabolic Steroid Use,
AM. J. PsYcHIATRY, April 1988, at 489-90.
102. See, e.g., Drooz, Steroid Use A Widening Addiction, Doctor Says, L.A. Times, Oct. 9,
1988, sec. 3, at 20, col. 6. Traditionally, scientific literature dealing with physiological effects of
anabolic steroids is generally based upon observations on infrahuman subjects, i.e., rats. In order
to systematically study structural as well as functional effects of anabolic steroids with human
beings, muscle tissue must be excised and histologically examined. See Stone & Lipner, supra note
22, at 353. This presents obvious problems. However, recently such researchers as Pope and
Katz have observed and documented the effects of steroids on human subjects. Their results
suggest that major psychiatric symptoms may be a common adverse effect of anabolic steroids.
See Pope & Katz, supra note 101.
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study showed anabolic steroid users may suffer from psychotic or near-
psychotic symptoms, manic episodes and major depression.103
Steroid use can also be both physically and psychologically addictive.1 4
Physically, many athletes experience severe depression following cessation
of the drug similar to that of any other drug addict.105 Psychologically,
steroid use can be compulsive and unstoppable, in what has been termed by
the medical community as "reverse anorexia." 1°  The steroid users have an
uncontrollable obsession with being big instead of skinny. This obsession
results in the continuing or increased usage of anabolic steroids.
Recently, the "steroid defense" was introduced to the criminal justice
system. A criminal defendant claimed that his frenzied use of anabolic ster-
oids had raised his level of aggressiveness to the point where he was unable
to appreciate that his actions were criminal. 7
F. Obtaining Steroids: The Black Market
As you will be informed by any civil libertarian or steroid user who has
tested positive, anabolic steroids are not ilegal.108 They are not classified as
a controlled substance. Anabolic steroids can be legally obtained through
prescription, or illegally through the black market." 9
It has been estimated that only twenty percent of steroid users obtain
them by prescription and that the black market supplies the other eighty
percent.110 This estimate has particularly disturbed many doctors because
the drugs are generally self-administered without supervision or training,
and in most instances in ignorance of the potential harmful, even lethal,
103. See Pope & Katz, supra note 101.
104. Id.
105. See Vecsey, supra note 3; see also Strauss, supra note 49.
106. See Drooz, supra note 102; see also Johnson, supra note 41, at 49.
107. See Thomas, Steroid Use Goes On Trial, N.Y. Times, April 2, 1986, at A-22, col. 1.
Michael David Williams, a 26-year old Navy aircraft mechanic and avid body builder, broke into
six Maryland homes and set fire to three of them. After a full confession, his lawyer raised a
defense of diminished capacity due to steroid use.
108. See supra note 12. Brian Bosworth, the outspoken former All-American linebacker of
the Oklahoma Sooners, was highly critical of the NCAA after they banned him from participating
in the 1987 Orange Bowl after he tested positive for steroids. "Steroids are a legal drug .... I'll
continue to fight against the abuse of drugs - recreational drugs that are destroying society.
Steroids aren't destroying society." See Cowart, supra note 43, at 56.
109. See, ag., Penn, Muscling In ,4s Ever More People Try 4nabolic Steroids, Traffickers Take
Over, Wall Street J., Oct. 4, 1988, at A-1, col. 1.
110. See, eg., Cowart, Some Predict Increased Steroid Use In Sports Despite Drug Testing,
Crackdown on Suppliers, J. A.M.A., 3025 (1987).
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consequences."' Further, since most of these drugs are obtained through
illicit channels, there is no guarantee that the product is genuine or even
safe. 1 12
However, the black market shows little sign of abating since demand for
the drugs is great. Federal authorities now estimate that sales of illicit ster-
oids in the United States exceed $100 million a year. 13 The black market
further encourages steroid use because of the easy and cheap availability of
the drugs. Athletes have no problem obtaining illegal steroids through
gymnasiums, health clubs, mail-order houses, and in many instances other
athletes and even coaches.1 14
The unauthorized sale of steroids in the United States was recently up-
graded from a misdemeanor to a felony by Congress. However, they have
not been on the list of substances that the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) actively pursues.11 5 In recent years, other U.S. agencies have
begun cracking down on the illegal steroid traffickers. In 1985, a drug task
force was formed by the Justice Department, Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to begin nation-
wide criminal investigations of the black market distribution of anabolic
steroids." 6 Several arrests have been made of suspected dealers, illegal
manufacturers and distributors. 7 The legal manufacturers and distribu-
tors were advised of their responsibility to ensure that their sales of steroids
111. See Schmeck, supra note 8. "What they [steroid users] get, basically, is a bottle with
white pills in it" and the steroid users have little, if any, real knowledge of the strength or even the
true identity of what they are getting. Id.
112. See Penn, supra note 109, at A-20. More than half of the steroids smuggled into the U.S.
are counterfeit, bearing the names of reputable manufacturers. When some of these drugs were
tested, they were found to contain high concentrations of cortisone, a by-product that is supposed
to be removed and that can be deadly if administered to a person allergic to it. Id.
113. See Alfano & Janofsky, On the Black Market, Drugs Are In Easy Reach of Public, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 18, 1988, at A-I, col. 1. The demand for counterfeit steroids increased in the United
States when the F.D.A. determined that generic steroids were not of any great medical value and
limited their production. Id.; see also Penn, supra note 109.
114. See Penn, supra note 109. Richard Fitton, former strength coach at Auburn, was sen-
tenced to four and one-half years in prison and five years probation for conspiracy to import
steroids and a litany of other charges. E.J. Kreis, former strength coach at Vanderbilt, was in-
dicted for illegally selling 100,000 doses of anabolic steroids to athletes of three universities. See
Scorecard, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 9, 1985, at 11.
115. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 was signed into law on November 29, 1988. The
distribution of anabolic steroids is proscribed in section 2403.
116. See, e.g., Council Report, Drug Abuse in Athletes Anabolic Steroids and Human Growth
Hormone, J. A.M.A., 1704 (1988).
117. See Penn, supra note 109.
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were limited only to authorized customers, and were requested to report
unusually large or frequent orders of certain steroid products.118
G. Present Testing Procedures For Steroids
Keeping drugs out of competition is the goal of many testing procedures
governing sports. However, most drug testers agree that a clean report at
competition time does not necessarily mean that the athlete did not use
drugs during training and prior to the competition.1 19 Because of the pres-
ent testing procedures, it is impossible to determine which athletes may
have gained an advantage over the rest of the competitors due to steroids. 120
The problem with current steroid testing procedures is that the athlete
knows the exact date and the exact drugs for which he or she will be
tested.12 1 This allows the athlete several ways to "beat" the testing proce-
dure: either by using extra drugs to mask the steroids they have already
ingested, 122 or by stopping usage of the drug in time to clean out their sys-
tems. This explains the "pyramiding" and "stacking" procedures that
118. See Council Report, supra note 116.
119. See Cowart, Pre-Olympic Games, Now In Progress Demand World-Class Medical Team-
work, J. A.M.A., Aug. 14, 1987, at 741; see also Bergman & Leach, supra note 5. The athletes
caught only represent the tip of the steroid "iceberg." The New York Times reported that at least
half of the 9000 athletes competing in the Seoul Olympics have used anabolic steroids. See Janof-
sky & Alfano, System Accused of Failing Test Posed by Drugs, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1988, at A-1,
col. 1.
120. In the 1987 World Track Championships in Rome, Ben Johnson set a world record in
the 100 meter dash. After the race, Johnson was immediately tested for illegal drug use. The tests
came back negative. However, after testing positive for anabolic steroids at the 1988 Olympic
Games, Johnson testified before the Canadian Board of Inquiry that he had been on steroids prior
to setting the world record in Rome in 1987. In fact, Johnson testified that he had been on
steroids for six years prior to his 1987 world record in Rome, yet at no time prior to the 1988
Olympics did Johnson test positive for steroids. See Noden, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 26,
1989, at 98; see also, Hersh, supra note 81.
121. See infra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
122. See Lamb, supra note 74, at 33. Some athletes are using injections of human gonado-
tropin to stimulate a more gradual secretion of natural testosterone from the testes to avoid detec-
tion. Id. Diuretics also were used for masking drug use until they were added to the list of
forbidden drugs in 1988. Diuretics are used to help the athlete produce more urine in hopes of
diluting the steroid beyond the limits of detection. See Benjamin, supra note 2, at 75. Spain's
Pedro Delgado won the 1988 Tour de France cycling championships but tested positive for
probenecid, a diuretic. Probenecid was not prohibited until after the race, and Delgado kept his
championship. Id. Athletes are now even injecting testosterone to mask steroid use. A normal
male passes between 40 and 110 billionths of a gram per milliliter of testosterone in their urine.
Anabolic steroids, a synthetic derivative of testosterone, reduces the actual production, so that
only between 15 to 30 billionths of a gram are passed. Athletes hope that by injecting testosterone
prior to testing, their urine sample will reflect a higher concentration of testosterone to mask
steroid use. See Altman, supra note 39.
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many athletes follow. It allows them to obtain optimal results from steroid
use while minimizing the likelihood of detection.
In addition -to using masking agents, many athletes are experimenting
with new drugs. The human growth hormone (hGE), medically known as
somatotropin, and the growth hormone (GH), are two powerful new drugs
that athletes are using because they hope for the same anabolic effects as
steroids.1 23 Presently, hGH and GH are not on the list of drugs banned
from international athletic competition, and also are believed to be umde-
tectable in current drug testing procedures.1 24
Anabolic steroids are taken far in advance of any competition or testing
date and are metabolized so extensively that laboratories must look not only
for the drug itself, but also for the metabolic by-products. 125 Testing re-
quires state-of-the-art drug identification laboratories using gas chromatog-
raphy and mass spectrometry, which can separate and identify chemical
compounds and chemical by-products from the sample.126 At peak effi-
ciency, with ordinary staffing, these laboratories can analyze only forty
samples a day. 127
The tests are conducted by examining a sample of the athlete's urine.128
Athletes are required to submit to this urinalysis procedure only at high
level competition because the analysis is expensive, ranging from $10029 to
$250130 per test. These costs reflect not only the expensive equipment used,
but also the creation of metabolic pattern libraries in which to store the
different chemical patterns.13 '
123. See Lamb, supra note 74, at 33; see also Council Report, supra note 116.
124. Id. The New York Times reports that underground research has enabled athletes to use
as many as a dozen performance enhancing substances that present testing procedures cannot
detect. See Janofsky & Alfano, supra note 119.
125. See Cowart, supra note 43, at 57.
126. See Altman, supra note 39, at C-3, col. 1.
127. See Cowart, supra note 28, at 422. The staffing at the state of the art testing centers is
generally low, and this contributes to the small number of testings that can be accomplished
during normal efficiency. However, when staffing is increased, the labs have much greater poten-
tial and can commit to 24-hour turnaround testing. For example, during the 1984 Summer
Olympic Games, the Ziffren Olympic Analytical Facility in Los Angeles tested more than 1,650
samples in a little more than ten days. Id.
128. See Benjamin, supra note 2, at 77.
129. Id.
130. See Neff & Sullivan, The NFL and Drugv" Fumbling for a Game Plan, SpoRTS ILLUS-
TRATED, Feb. 10, 1986, at 83.
131. See Cowart, supra note 43, at 57. Testing for various synthetic drugs is extremely com-
plex. The number and type of metabolites differs with each drug. The chemical formulations of
each metabolite can vary in terms of how long it has been present in the body. Some metabolites
appear within hours of ingestion and quickly disappear; others appear only days or weeks after the
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The actual testing procedure varies at the different competitive levels.
At the Olympic level, urine tests for anabolic steroids began in 1976.132
The four top finishers in each individual event, plus one athlete selected at
random from the field, are tested for the presence of illegal substances.
1 33
The athletes are given one hour following competition to report and pro-
duce a urine sample.13
4
On January 10, 1986, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA), the governing body of college athletics, authorized drug testing
for any athlete competing in an NCAA-sanctioned championship event and
in eighteen of the major college post-season football bowl games. 35 To be
eligible for intercollegiate championship competition, each collegiate athlete
must sign a consent form stating they will submit themselves to drug testing
procedures.136 The failure to sign a current form will result in ineligibility
for that particular athlete from any NCAA-sanctioned collegiate
championship. 37
Although the NCAA has not sanctioned the random testing of athletes
outside championship events, several leagues have considered such testing.
steroid has been taken. This can result in as many as ten different patterns for one drug. See
Altman, supra note 39.
132. See Lamb, supra note 74, at 32-33.
133. See Janofsky, supra note 13. In weightlifting in addition to the top four finishers, two
other athletes are chosen randomly, rather than only one.
134. See Strauss, supra note 49, at 746.
135. See, eg., White, N.C.A.A. Votes for Drug Testing, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1986, at A-19,
col. 4. The NCAA conducts 78 championship events for men and women. The testing would
allow the NCAA to randomly examine any of the athletes entered in those events. Any athlete
testing positive for any one of 86 prohibited drugs will be barred from the championship competi-
tion and suspended from the sport for at least 90 days thereafter. Id.
136. The student athlete signs the following consent form:
Drug-Testing Consent
In the event I participate in any NCAA championship event or in any NCAA certified
postseason football contest on behalf of an NCAA member institution during the current
academic year, I hereby consent to be tested in accordance with the procedures adopted by
the NCAA to determine if I have utilized, in preparation for or participation in such event
or contest, a substance on the list of banned drugs set forth in Executive Regulation 1-7-
(b). I have reviewed the rules and procedures for NCAA drug testing and I understand
that if I test "positive" I shall be ineligible for postseason competition for a minimum
period of 90 days and may be charged thereafter upon further testing with the loss of
postseason eligibility in all sports for the current and succeeding academic year. I further
understand that this consent and my test results will become part of my educational
records subject to disclosure only in accordance with my written Buckley Amendment
consent and the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974.
Signature of Student-Athlete
See National Collegiate Athletic Association, The NCAA Drug-Testing Program 1986-87.
137. See 1987-88 NCAA Drug Testing Program, Part II, CONST. 3-9-(i).
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The Big Ten Football Conference recently discussed mandatory league-
wide testing of football players for anabolic steroids.13 1 University of Mich-
igan's athletic director and former football coach, Bo Schembechler stated:
"Testing is the only right thing to do .... That isn't a great revelation.
When you're talking about the health of a kid, we have to do everything
possible to eliminate this from the game."
13 9
In the NFL, the players are tested during training camp as part of their
team physicals. 1" Any other testing of the athlete during the year must be
based upon a showing of "reasonable cause" to suspect drug use. 14
1
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DRUG TESTING:
A NEED FOR STATE ACTION
In evaluating the constitutionality of any drug testing program, a
threshold inquiry must be made regarding the status of the party allegedly
violating the athlete's rights - in this case the testing organization. A. vio-
lation of the individual rights and liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
can only be prohibited if the testing organization's activities are found to
constitute "state action." '142 The doctrine of state action was formulated
more than one hundred years ago, yet despite its antiquity, it still operates
as a viable limitation on suits of constitutional discrimination.
A. The Doctrine of State Action
The Constitution itself is focused primarily upon the operations of gov-
ernment, so there are relatively few references to individual rights. Re-
sponding to the demand for additional constitutional protections for the
individual, the First Congress drafted the Bill of Rights. On its face, the Bill
of Rights is abound with individual rights and liberties. However, in 1833,
the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice John Marshall, held that the par-
ticular provisions of the Bill of Rights shielded individuals only from ac-
tions initiated by the national government. 143
More than three decades later, the post-Civil War amendments pro-
vided the Court with another opportunity to apply the fundamental princi-
138. See, eg., Big 10 Coaches Urge Steroid Testing, Chicago Tribune, July 27, 1989, § 4, at
13, col. 1.
139. See Sherman, Coaches Claim Illinois Michigan's Only Threat, The Chicago Tribune,
July 28, 1989, § 4, at 3, col.5.
140. See 1982 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NFLPA AND NFL MAN-
AGEMENT COUNCIL, art. XXXI, § 5 [hereinafter 1982 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT].
141. Id., art. XXXI, § 7.
142. See infra notes 143-167 and accompanying text.
143. Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
[Vol. 1:93
STEROIDS IN ATHLETICS
pals of the Bill of Rights to any discriminatory action, public or private.
However, in the Civil Rights Cases,1" the Supreme Court determined that
the individual protections of the Bill of Rights, and later, to the extent that
the post-Civil War amendments were incorporated, limited only national
and state action and not the acts of private individuals or entities. Writing
for the majority, Justice Bradley stated:
[C]ivil rights, such as are guarantied [sic] by the constitution against
state aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individ-
uals, unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws, customs,
or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individ-
ual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong,
or a crime of that individual. 145
This left a sphere of private autonomy free from governmental infringe-
ment - a sphere of private behavior in which individuals are free to dis-
criminate. The Constitution can "erect no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."' "
The doctrine of state action is not strictly confined to actions taken by
the legislative, executive, judiciary or administrative branches of the federal
and state governments. In certain situations, state action can be found to
include actions of seemingly private individuals or organizations.'47 Where
it is alleged that a federal or state statute is discriminatory and state action
is obvious, the court will not make any formal inquiry into the matter.1 48
However, where the alleged violations are those of a seemingly private indi-
vidual or entity, the issue of state action will arise. Absent a finding of state
action, the court can afford no remedy for the constitutional infraction, and
the private individual or entity is free to discriminate.
The Supreme Court has articulated four ways in which essentially pri-
vate conduct can be deemed to be state action. 49 For purposes of this arti-
144. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
145. Id. at 17.
146. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). This maxim is best exemplified in Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, where despite a private club's overtly racially discriminatory policies,
absent state action, the repugnant policies could not be prohibited. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
147. See, eg., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1984) (dismissal of private school
teacher did not constitute state action, even though the school received sufficient public funds,
because there was an insufficient nexus between the school's employment practices and funding
program).
148. See, eg., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (high school officials need not obtain
a warrant prior to searching a student who is under their authority; however, school officials must
have reasonable grounds to suspect that the search will turn up incriminating evidence).
149. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). The Court noted that several differ-
ent tests for determining "state action" had been articulated in prior decisions: (1) the "public
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cle, only two are important: the "nexus test" and the "public function
test."150
Under the nexus test, there must be "a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action
of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself." '51 Private
actions are not ascribed to the State unless it has exercised coercive pDwer
or has provided such significant encouragement, either overtly or covertly,
that the action must be deemed to be that of the state. 15
2
Under the public function test, it is not enough to show that the private
individual or entity was serving a "public function."15 3 Rather, the private
action must be an activity that is "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the state."1 54 Although many functions have been traditionally performed
by state governments, very few are exclusively reserved to the state. 55 The
public function test is particularly stringent and has not been invoked in
over two decades.1 56
-function" test; (2) the "state compulsion" test; (3) the "nexus" test; and (4) the "joint action" test.
Ra at 939.
150. The two other tests recognized by the Court in Lugar are clearly not applicable to the
drug testing policy of the NCAA. The "state compulsion" test applies only in the context of state
domination of the private entity. See, e-g., Peterson v. City of Greenfield, 373 U.S. 244 (1963)
(state laws compelling racial discrimination by private parties violated the fourteenth amend-
ment).
The "joint action" test has occasionally been equated with the "nexus" test, but was limited by
the Court in Lugar to prejudgement attachment cases. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 n.21. See generally
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (Medicaid recipients failed to prove that substantial state
funding of nursing home established "state action" in regard to nursing home's decision to trans-
fer Medicaid recipients to lower levels of care). But see NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
Justice White's dissent begins: "The question here is whether the NCAA acted jointly with
UNLV in suspending Tarkanian and thereby also become a state actor." Id at 199. White's
dissent concludes that the NCAA and UNLV were joint actors and therefore the NCAA was a
state actor; however the majority held that the interests of UNLV and the NCAA "have clashed
throughout the investigation" and that they were "antagonists, not joint participants ...." Id at
196 n.16.
151. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
152. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
153. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939. In Jackson, The Court stated that although "[d]octors, optome-
trists, lawyers... and [a] grocery selling a quart of milk are all in regulated businesses, providing
arguably essential goods and services 'affected with a public interest,"' their activities do not
constitute state action. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354.
154. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353.
155. Flagg Bros., v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978). It has been suggested by the Court that
such activities as education, fire and police protection, and even the collection of taxes, may not
satisfy the public function test. Id. at 163.
156. The last decision by the Court holding a function to be traditionally the exclusive pre-
rogative of the state was Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308 (1968). That desion was limited in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), and
eventually overruled in Hodgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,157 the Court considered both the nexus and
the public function tests. The employees of a private school brought a fed-
eral civil rights action claiming that school officials had wrongfully termi-
nated their employment in violation of their first, fifth and fourteenth
amendment rights. 15 The school had received public funds that accounted
for at least ninety percent of the school's operating budget,1" and it was
heavily regulated by the state."6 The Court held that there was no state
action because there was an insufficient nexus between the school's employ-
ment practices and the government funding program. 6 ' The decision to
terminate the claimants' employment was not compelled or in any way in-
fluenced by the state regulation.162 As Chief Justice Burger's majority opin-
ion articulated:
The school ... is not fundamentally different from many private
corporations whose business depends primarily on contracts to build
roads, bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for the government. Acts
of such private contractors do not become acts of the government by
reason of their significant or even total engagement in performing
public contracts .... Here the relationship between the school and
its teachers and counselors is not changed because the State pays the
tuition of the students.163
Under the public function test, the Court held that although there "can
be no doubt that the education of maladjusted high school students is a
public function,"' 6 it is not a service that is in the exclusive province of the
state. 16 5 The mere fact that a private entity performs a function that serves
the public interest does not make the activity state action. 66
Despite the prevalence of the state in the operations of the school,16 7
absent a showing that the state influenced or retained some control over the
decision making of the private entity, the Court will not find the requisite
state action.
157. 457 U.S. 830 (1984).
158. Id. at 835.
159. Id. at 832.
160. Id. at 833.
161. Id. at 840-41.
162. Id. at 841.
163. Id. at 840-41.
164. Id. at 842.
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also supra note 153.
167. As Justice Marshall's dissent cogently points out: "The school receives almost all of its
funds from the State, and is heavily regulated. This nexus between the school and the State is so
substantial that the school's action must be considered state action." Rendell, 457 U.S. at 847
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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1. State Action at the High School Level
Where it is alleged that a state or federal statute has violated a student's
rights at a public high school, state action is obvious, and the Court will not
make a formal inquiry into the matter. 6 Accordingly, the rights and liber-
ties of the public high school students are protected by the federal constitu-
tion. However, where a private school is involved in the alleged violation,
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn provides that there must be sufficient ties between
the alleged wrongful activity and the state to justify intervention. 69 Absent
compelling state influence regarding the wrongful activity, no state action
will be found, and the federal constitution will not protect the rights and
liberties of the students. 170
2. The Collegiate Level: Do NCAA Regulations Constitute State
Action?
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is a voluntary,
unincorporated association consisting of approximately nine hundred and
sixty public and private colleges and universities.1 71 Nearly one-half of its
members are public institutions, which provide the NCAA with more than
one-half of its decisions regarding rules and regulations.
17 1
The NCAA is the governing body for the majority of collegiate athlet-
ics. 1 71 It holds annual meetings in which all its members are represented.174
At these conventions, rules are promulgated to insure minimum standards
for scholarship, sportsmanship and amateur status. 171 Each institution that
is a member of the NCAA must abide by these rules and regulations. An
elected counsel is empowered to enforce these rules and regulations, and
168. See supra note 148; see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
169. Rendell, 457 U.S. at 840-41.
170. In Rendell-Baker, the plaintiff was an employee of the privately operated school. How-
ever, whether the plaintiff is an employee or student of a private school should make no difference
in the state action analysis, since it is the nexus between the state and the challenged action upon
which the Court focuses, and not the status of the plaintiff.
171. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
172. O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
173. There are several other national associations regulating intercollegiate sports, including
the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA), which is composed mostly of small
enrollment four-year colleges and universities; the National Junior College Athletic Association,
composed of two year colleges; and the Association of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women
(AIAW), controlling women's sports for many colleges and universities. However, since the
NCAA began offering national championships in women's sports in 1981-82, the AIAW member-
ship has declined. The NCAA is the largest and most powerful of the national associations.
174. Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1984).
175. Id.
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may impose penalties for violations against both the university and individ-
ual players for any violations." 6
Although the NCAA is not a public institution, prior to the decision in
Rendell-Baker, most courts considered NCAA actions to be "state action,"
and therefore, subject to the limitations of the fourteenth amendment. 7
The rationale was that the NCAA performed a public function by regulat-
ing intercollegiate athletics and that there was substantial interdependence
between the NCAA and the public institutions, which comprised about
one-half of its members."7 8 Further, it was the opinion of these courts that
the public institution members played a "substantial although admittedly
not pervasive"'7 9 role in the NCAA funding and decision-making. Accord-
ingly, this indirect involvement of state governments, through publically
funded universities, could convert what was seemingly private conduct into
state action.1
80
Since Rendell-Baker, an overwhelming majority of courts have held that
the adoption, implementation and enforcement of NCAA rules does not
constitute state action. 81 In Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation,"' a college tennis player challenged the NCAA and sought an in-
junction restricting the enforcement of an NCAA eligibility rule. 3
Arlosoroff alleged that NCAA rules constituted state action subject to
the equal protection and due process limitations of the fourteenth
amendments. 184
The Arlosoroff court held that although the NCAA may be said to per-
form a public function by regulating intercollegiate athletics, in order to
conclude that the NCAA conduct is attributable to the state, a claimant
176. Id.
177. See, eg., Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 478 (1977); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v.
NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th
Cir. 1974).
178. Howard Univ., 510 F.2d at 218.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See, eg., McCormick v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Karamanos v. NCAA,
816 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir, 1986); Arlosoroff, 746
F.2d 1019; O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. 997; Barbay v. NCAA, 1987 WL 5619 (E.D. La. 1987)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds database); Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. Ill. 1987); Kneeland
v. NCAA, 650 F. Supp. 1047 (W.D. Tex. 1986); McHale v. Cornell Univ., 620 F. Supp. 67
(N.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Ponce v. Basketball Fed'n of Com. of Puerto Rico, 760 F.2d 375 (1st
Cir. 1985) (Puerto Rican amateur sports association, analogous to NCAA, is not state actor);
Spath v. NCAA, 728 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1984) (in dicta, court stated that NCAA is not state actor).
182. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
183. Id. at 1020.
184. Id.
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must show either that: (1) the NCAA was serving a function that was "tra-
ditionally exclusively reserved to the states' "I prerogative; or (2) the state
in its regulatory and subsidizing function caused or ordered the NCAA ac-
tion. 1 86 Absent such a showing, the conduct could not be said to be "state
action" and could not be challenged under the fourteenth amendment."' 7
The Arlosoroff court then held that although the NCAA's scheme of
regulating intercollegiate athletics may be of some public service, it is not a
function that is traditionally reserved to the state. 8 Moreover, although
the NCAA is made up of public and private universities, there was no indi-
cation that state universities "vote[d] as a block.., over the objection of
private institutions"'1 9 and caused or ordered the NCAA actions. 190 Ac-
cordingly, the NCAA regulations are adopted through the representatives
of all of its members, and not as a result of government compulsion.191 The
adoption of the NCAA rules is private conduct and not state action. Thus,
the Arlosoroff court effectively foreclosed all challenges of the NCAA rules
constituting "state action" since neither prong of the test could be effec-
tively proven.
In O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 92 a student athlete chal-
lenged not only the NCAA drug testing program, but further alleged that
the University of Washington's implementation and administration of the
NCAA program constituted "state action."1 93 The O'Halloran court held
that the enforcement of the NCAA testing program by the University of
Washington, a public university, did not constitute state action.1 94 The
O'Halloran court cited the Arlosoroff test stating:
It is not enough that an institution is highly regulated and subsidized
by a state. If the state in its regulatory or subsidizing function does
not order or cause the action complained of, and the function is not
one traditionally reserved to the state, there is no state action.1 95
The O'Halloran court concluded that the State of Washington had not
exercised coercive power or provided significant encouragement, overtly or
185. Id. at 1021 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1975)).
186. Id. at 1022; see also supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
187. Id.
188. IaL at 1021.
189. Id. at 1022.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash. 1988), rev'd on procedural grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th
Cir. 1988).
193. Id. at 998.
194. Id. at 1000.
195. Id. at 1001 (quoting Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021-22).
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covertly, to the University of Washington so that either the promulgation
or enforcement of the NCAA drug testing program could be deemed to be
state action.
1 9 6
The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether the enforcement of the NCAA rules by a public university
constituted state action. 97 In NCAA v. Tarkanian, 8 Jerry Tarkanian, the
head basketball coach of the University of Nevada-Las Vegas (UNLV), a
public university, was sanctioned by UNLV officials after an NCAA com-
mittee concluded that Tarkanian had violated ten NCAA rules governing
the recruitment of potential players.1 99 Pursuant to the agreement between
the NCAA and its fellow members, the NCAA requested that UNLV offi-
cials suspend Tarkanian or additional penalties would be assessed against
the university.' ° Tarkanian, facing demotion and a substantial reduction
in pay, brought suit alleging that UNLV's actions in compliance with the
NCAA rules and recommendations made the NCAA's conduct "state
action.
' 20 1
Although the Court agreed that UNLV was without question a state
actor and that its conduct was clearly influenced by the rules and recom-
mendations of the NCAA, it did not follow that UNLV's actions in compli-
ance with the NCAA rules and recommendations turned the NCAA's
conduct into state action.20 2 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
stated that despite the NCAA rules, UNLV still retained the authority to
withdraw from the NCAA and establish its own standards and that "the
NCAA did not - indeed, could not - directly discipline Tarkanian or any
other state university employee."203 Despite the fact that withdrawal from
the NCAA was not a viable option for a national collegiate basketball
"power-house" like UNLV, Justice Stevens stated that although "UNLV's
options were unpalatable does not mean that they were nonexistent." 2'
The Arlosoroff court established that the NCAA regulations, such as
drug testing, are immune from the application of the state action doc-
trine.2 5 The O'Halloran court further insulated the NCAA drug testing
program by holding that a public university's implementation of the pro-
196. Id. at 1002.
197. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
198. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
199. Id. at 188.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 195.
203. Id. at 197.
204. Id. at 198, n.19.
205. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
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gram does not constitute state action." 6 The Tarkanian Court validated
both these rulings with an incisive decision. Further, absent a finding of
state action, the NCAA athlete will be unable to rely on the federal consti-
tutional safeguards to protect them. This means the NCAA is free to instill
mandatory random drug testing of its NCAA student-athletes free from
any federal constitutional limitations.
The only constitutional safeguard remaining for collegiate athletes is a
state constitution or statutory provision providing additional protections.
For example, Simone LeVant, the captain of the Stanford University wo-
men's diving team, successfully challenged the constitutionality of the
NCAA drug testing program.20 7 LeVant alleged that the NCAA testing
program violated her right to privacy under article I, section 1 of the Cali-
fornia Constitution.2 °0 The privacy rights guaranteed under the California
Constitution are broader than those guaranteed by the federal constitution
and are enforceable against private entities like the NCAA.20 9 Accordingly,
the federal doctrine of state action is inapplicable.
3. State Action at the Professional Level: The National Football
League
Although state governments regulate professional sports franchises, in
light of the decision in Rendell-Baker, it is difficult to conceive these regula-
tions constituting state action. The collective bargaining agreement that
regulates the testing procedures is an agreement between the owners and
the NFL players.210 There is no indication that the state caused or ordered
the testing, nor is the regulation of professional athletics a function that has
traditionally been the exclusive prerogative of the state.
206. 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
207. A California state judge issued an injunction that prevented LeVant from having to
supply a urine sample pursuant to the NCAA program. See LeVant v. NCAA, Mar. 11, 1987
(Cal. Super. Ct.) (No. 619209). Subsequent to LeVant, another Stanford student, Jennifer Hill, a
soccer player, was also successful in preventing the NCAA from obtaining a urine sample. See
Hill v. NCAA, Nov. 19, 1987 (Cal. Super. Ct.) (No. 619209).
208. The California Constitution provides: "All people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy."
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
209. See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 262-63, 625
P.2d 779, 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871 (1981).
210. See infra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
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IV. MANDATORY RANDOM DRUG TESTING AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The drug testing of athletes calls into question four constitutional guar-
antees: (1) freedom from unlawful searches and seizures; (2) the right of
privacy; (3) equal protection rights; and (4) due process of law. The follow-
ing sections will examine the impact of drug testing upon the rights and
privileges of professional,21" ' collegiate and high school athletes to drug
testing.
A. The National Football League and Unilateral Implementation of
Random Testing
In the National Football League (NFL), the drug testing policies are
governed by the collective bargaining agreements between the players asso-
ciation (NFLPA) and the management counsel (NFLMC).21 2 A unionized
employer, like the NFLMC, which implements a drug testing program for
its employee-players, must comply with the requirements of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).213 With respect to wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment, the NLRA requires that the employer
and union bargain in good faith.214
The 1982 agreement215 provides only for testing during physicals, and
any additional tests must be based upon "reasonable cause" to believe the
player is using illegal drugs.216 The agreement specifically provides that
there will be no "spot checking for chemical abuse or dependency" '217 by an
NFL franchise. Although the NFL has conducted past drug testing, the
testing was limited to "street drugs." The NFL did not begin testing for
steroids until 1987.218
However, the NFL's new policy of testing for steroids runs into serious
legal questions in light of the 1982 Agreement. An employer who decides
211. For the purposes of this article, the only professional challenges that will be examined
are those by the National Football League Players Association.
212. See 1982 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. XXXI, §§ 5, 7.
213. The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1989), was amended
by the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1989).
214. Section 8(d) of the NLRA states that "the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment ...." Id.
215. As of the date of this publishing, the league and the players have been without a contract
since September 1, 1987, although most of the 1982 provisions are presently being followed. See
George, Gap Gets Wider in Labor Negotiations, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1988, at A-21, col. 3.
216. 1982 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. XXXI, § 7.
217. Id.
218. See NFL Planning Tests for Steroids, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1986, at D-30, col. 5.
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to implement a drug testing program, or to change an existing one, would
be deemed to have changed a condition of employment.2 19 As with any
condition of employment, the NFLMC would be required to bargain over
the contents of a new, or the changing of an old policy. The NFLMC could
not implement it unilaterally; thus, critics argue that the NFL has no legal
basis on which to test for steroids.
A recent opinion of an NFL arbitrator confirmed that the NFLMC
could not unilaterally implement a drug testing program. The arbitration
decision stemmed from a statement by NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle
that the NFL would begin a program of randomly testing the players for
drugs.220 Rozelle and the NFLMC contended that the order for random
testing was an exercise of residual disciplinary authority that was vested in
the Commissioner pursuant to the 1982 Agreement.221 Rozelle contended
that he had violated the bargained-for provision on drug testing because his
disciplinary authority superseded any agreement provisions. 222 The arbitra-
tor did not agree with this contention:
[C]ertain... subject areas, such as drug testing and the evaluation of
chemical dependency treatment facilities were addressed by the col-
lective bargaining agreement and represented limitations on club
and/or the Commissioner's right to change those agreements ....
[T]he Commissioner's rule-making authority was supplanted, in cer-
tain respects, by specific agreement language.., which established
clear procedures concerning... testing .... [The Players' Associa-
tion has] consistently resisted suggestions from the Commissioner
... which would have enlarged the scope of testing for chemical
dependency by including "unscheduled" analyses.223
219. Analogous court decisions have held that the implementation of testing programs for
current or prospective employees is a changed condition of employment and is a mandatory sub-
ject of collective bargaining. See, eg., Peerless Publications, Inc, 231 N.L.R.B. 244 (1977), re-
manded, 636 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (new disciplinary proceedings); Medicenter, Mid-South
Hospital, 211 N.L.R.B. 670 (1975) (new polygraph testing for present employees); Amoco Chemi-
cals, 211 N.L.R.B. 618, 622-23 (1974), enforced in pertinent part, 529 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1976)
(alteration of work and disciplinary rules).
220. See National Football League Players Association and National Football League Manage-
ment Council, (Kasher, Arb.) (Oct. 25, 1986) (Unpublished opinion). On July 7, Commissioner
Rozelle publically announced his unilateral new drug testing program that would require every
player to submit to two unscheduled urine tests during the regular season. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. In a related but separate decision, Commissioner Rozelle sought to have every
player tested for drugs as part of the post-season physical exam. The NFLPA asserted that any
urinalysis or blood testing during the post-season physical exam violated the existing collective
bargaining agreement that authorized only two forms of drug testing: (1) the mandatory drug test
during pre-season physicals; and (2) testing upon reasonable cause. These issues were also submit-
ted to an arbitrator who found that Rozelle and NFLMC could not impose post-season drug
[Vol. 1:93
STEROIDS IN ATHLETICS
As suggested by the arbitration decision, and other analogous judicial
decisions, where players and management have bargained for a specific pro-
vision, such as drug testing, management does not have the authority to
unilaterally change or expand the scope of testing provisions by asserting
inherent managerial rights.224 If management wants a mandatory random
drug testing program, such a program must be bargained for in good faith
and specifically stated within the bargaining agreement.
After dragging their feet for years, Pete Rozelle and the NFL owners
announced that beginning with the 1989 football season, any player found
to be using anabolic steroids will be suspended in the same manner as those
who use recreational drugs. A positive testing will result in a warning, a
second offense will bring a thirty-day suspension, and a third offense a mini-
mum one-year suspension.225 However, a football player is still tested only
once a year, and detection can be easily avoided.226 In dealing with the
problem of steroids, the standard of "reasonable cause" is unworkable. If
the Players' Association truly represents the best interests of the players,
then they should not hesitate to adopt a mandatory random drug testing
policy for anabolic steroids and their synthetic derivatives.
B. Random Testing and the Fourth Amendment
1. Does Drug Testing Constitute a "Search" Within the Meaning of the
Fourth Amendment?
The fourth amendment protects the "right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures .... "227 This imposes a standard of reasonableness upon the exer-
cise of discretion by government officials in order to safeguard the privacy
and security of individuals against arbitrary intrusions by government offi-
cials.228 However, before coming under the scrutiny of the fourth amend-
testing without violating the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement. See National Football
League Players Association and National Football League Management Council, (Kagel, Arb.)
(Oct. 20, 1985) (unpublished opinion).
224. See National Football League Players Assoc. v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1974).
Team owners attempted to unilaterally impose "bench fine" rules on players. The court held that
the rules were a condition of employment and thus, the commissioner had no authority to imple-
ment the rules. Id at 16-17.
225. See Scorecard, A Positive Step, SPORTS ILLUsTRATED, November 7, 1988, at 25-28.
226. See supra notes 121-22.
227. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
228. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979). The fourth amendment was first ap-
plied against the states in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Although Wolf involved an
unreasonable search and seizure in a criminal proceeding, the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures also is applicable in the non-criminal context. See Camara v. Municipal
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ment's "reasonableness" standard, the challenged governmental conduct
must first constitute a "search" or a "seizure." Does the taking of urine
from an athlete for testing purposes constitute a "search" or a "seizure?"
A majority of federal circuit courts have held that urine tests are
searches for fourth amendment purposes.2 29 In Schmerber v. California,2 30
the Court held that extracting blood from a criminal defendant to deter-
mine his alcohol levels was a search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.231 Other courts deciding the urine testing question have
drawn analogies to Schmerber;232 however, opponents are quick to point
out that urine, unlike blood, is a waste product that is routinely discharged
and does not involve any physical intrusion into the body, as taking a blood
sample requires.23a Therefore, unlike Schmerber, it cannot be said that the
taking of urine violates an individual's bodily integrity.234
The District Court for the Southern District of Iowa evaluated these
assertions in McDonell v. Hunter235 and stated:
Urine, unlike blood, is routinely discharged from the body, so no
governmental intrusion into the body is required to seize urine.
However, urine is discharged and disposed of under circumstances
where the person certainly has a legitimate expectation of privacy.
One does not reasonably expect to discharge urine under circum-
stances making it available for others to collect and analyze in order
to discover the personal physiological secrets it holds, except as a
part of a medical examination .... [B]oth blood and urine can be
analyzed in a medical laboratory to discover numerous physiological
facts about the person from whom it came .... One clearly has a
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). Most recently, in Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp.,
679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ind. 1988), the court held that public high school drug screening tests are
subject to fourth amendment protections. See infra notes 258-74 and accompanying text.
229. See, eg., Loworn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988); Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.) cert granted 486 U.S. 1042 (1988); Everett
v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507 (1 1th Cir. 1987); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818
F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th
Cir. 1987) cert. granted 485 U.S. 903 (1989); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987);
Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 986, (1986); Division 241
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029
(1976). Subsequent to the writing of this article, in Skinner Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109
S. Ct. 1402 (1989) and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989)
the Court held that the collection of urine samples by government official constitutes a "search"
under the fourth amendment.
230. 384 U.S. 747 (1966).
231. Id. at 767.
232. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
233, See infra notes 225-36 and accompanying text.
234. Id.
235. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
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reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in such personal
information contained in his body fluids.236
Accordingly, the McDonnell court held that the compelled production
of urine for drug testing analysis constitutes a search within the meaning of
the fourth amendment.237 Although a urine test does not require punctur-
ing an individual's body cavity, the governmental intrusion differs only in
degree, not kind. An individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy not
only in the expulsion of these fluids, but also in their contents.238
2. The Reasonableness of Random Testing
Having established that the collection of urine constitutes a search, the
next inquiry is whether the search was reasonable. Generally, the fourth
amendment requires a warrant based upon probable cause as a prerequisite
to any lawful search. However, the fourth amendment does not mandate
the issuance of a warrant, and the Supreme Court has enumerated several
exceptions to the warrant requirement.239
The warrantless search exceptions include searches made incident to a
lawful arrest,2' searches when there is immediate danger to a police officer
or to the community,24 1 searches when exigent circumstances are pres-
ent, 2 4 2 searches when a risk exists that the evidence might be destroyed,
24 3
or searches in highly regulated industries.2 1 However, even these excep-
tions may be limited by the fourth amendment's requirement of
reasonableness.
236. Id. at 1127. It can be said that a person has a double expectation of privacy in the taking
of samples for testing. First, a person has a legitimate expectation that the government will not
intrude upon their body and forcefully extract a sample. This extraction can be done with either a
needle or a test-tube. Second, a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the actual con-
tents of the sample taken. The revelations contained within the blood or urine are as secret and
private as one's diary, for they reveal to the government information that would otherwise be
unvailable.
237. Id.
238. See supra note 236.
239. See infra notes 240-44.
240. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (warrantless search of person and the area
within person's reach is permissible pursuant to a valid arrest).
241. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (officer may make reasonable search for weapons of
persons believed to be armed and dangerous regardless of probable cause).
242. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1981).
243. Schmerber, 384 U.S. 747 (1966) (removal of blood from suspect for testing in an emer-
gency situation is permissible without search warrant if reasonable means are used).
244. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (warrantless administrative search of commer-
cial property pursuant to federal statute is proper if inspection necessary to ensure law is properly
enforced).
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In determining the reasonableness of the search, a court must balance
the nature and quality of the intrusion against the legitimate governmental
interests advanced by the search.24 5 In O'Connor v. Ortega," the Court
stated that the determination of "reasonableness" is a two-step inquiry: (1)
"whether the ... action was justified at its inception;"'247 and (2) "was it
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified interference
in the first place."24 What is reasonable depends "on the context within
which a search takes place. 2
49
a. High School Drug Testing: "Reasonable Grounds" for Suspicion
In the context of fourth amendment protections as they relate to the
rights of students in public schools, the Court in New Jersey v. TL.O.25°
announced a specific test for search of students by school authorities. The
Court stated that the "legality of the search of a student should depend
simply on the reasonableness, under all circumstances of the search." 25'
In determining the reasonableness of the search, the T.L.O. Court bal-
anced the different interests and concluded that although the students have
a legitimate expectation of privacy, the school must maintain an atmos-
phere that is conducive to learning.2 2 Accordingly, school officials need
not obtain a warrant to conduct a search, nor are they subject to a probable
cause standard of suspicion.25 a
The T.L.O. Court expressly left open, and thus implied, that searches in
a school setting do not require individualized suspicion.254 There must only
be "reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence
that the student has violated or is violating either the law or rules of the
school."2 5
Under the first prong of the O'Connor test, to be "justified at the incep-
tion," a court must examine if the problem of drugs in high school athletes
245. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).
246. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
247. Id. at 726 (quoting New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 719 (quoting T.LO., 469 U.S. at 341).
250. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
251. Id. at 341.
252. Id. at 340.
253. Id.
254. Courts have generally held that prior to testing a public employee, the state must possess
reasonable suspicion that a particular employee was under the influence of drugs. See supra note
229. In T.LO., the Court stated: "We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an
essential element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school authorities." 469
U.S. at 342, n.8.
255. T.LO., 469 U.S. at 342.
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will operate to "justify school authorities in conducting searches unsup-
ported by individualized suspicion." '256 Under the second prong, the meas-
ures adopted must be reasonably related to the objectives of the search, and
not be excessive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of
the infraction.257
In Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corporation,2' the District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana examined the T.L.O. factors in
the context of a high school athletic drug testing program. The program
required that all varsity athletes consent to random urinalysis drug testing
before being eligible for interscholastic sports.259 The student athletes
sought an injunction to prevent the school district's implementation of the
testing program, and claimed the program violated the students' fourth
amendment rights. 2 °
The Schaill court began its analysis by examining whether the testing
was "justified at the inception." The court referred extensively to the
T.L.O. decision and concluded it had to examine whether "the circum-
stances peculiar to this case will operate to 'justify school authorities in
conducting searches unsupported by individual suspicion,' ",261 since there
was no evidence that these particular athletes used drugs. 262 The empirical
evidence showed that twenty to thirty percent of the students nationwide
have used drugs and that drug use, particularly in public schools, was a
matter of serious national concern.2 63
The Schaill court held the testing was justified at the inception because
256. Id. at 342 n.8; See also Schaill, 679 F. Supp. at 852.
257. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
258. 679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
259. Id. at 835-36. The Tippecanoe County School Corporation (TSC) required that students
involved in interscholastic sports submit the following form:
I have received and have read and understand a copy of the "T'SC DRUG EDUCATION
AND TESTING PROGRAM." I desire that - participate in this program and in
the inter-scholastic athletic program of - School and hereby voluntarily agree to
be subject to its terms. I accept the method of obtaining urine samples, testing and analy-
ses of such specimens, and all other aspects of the program. I agree to cooperate in furnish-
ing urine specimens that may be required from time to time. I further agree and consent to
the disclosure of the sampling, testing and results as provided for in this program. This
consent is given pursuant to all State and Federal Privacy Statutes and is a waiver of rights
to non-disclosure of such test records and results only to the extent of the disclosures
authorized in the program.
Id. at 836. Once a sample is provided it is given to a competent laboratory and is tested for
alcohol, street drugs and performance enhancing drugs such as steroids. Id. at 837.
260. Id. at 835.
261. Id. at 852 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8).
262. Id. at 855.
263. 679 F. Supp. 833, 855 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
MARQUETTE SPOR TS LAW JOURNAL
where there are social concerns at stake, wide latitude will be given
to school officials. The law is clear that this court's role is not to set
aside decisions of school administrators, even where the school's po-
sition might be viewed as lacking in wisdom or compassion, which
here, it is not so viewed."'
The next inquiry was whether the testing was reasonably related and not
excessive in scope. The Schaill court recognized that the testing program
involved students aged fourteen through eighteen, and that school officials
cannot run roughshod over the rights of students. 265 However, the court
noted that athletes have a "unique identity within the school community"
and "commit themselves to a system of discipline ' 2 66 not imposed on the
general student population. The participation in interscholastic athletics, in
and of itself, reduces the student athletes' legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy.267 These factors, taken in conjunction with the school's interest in
maintaining a drug-free athletic program, the health and safety of the stu-
dents and the preservation of an environment conducive to learning out-
weighed the student athletes' expectations of privacy.2 6 Accordingly, the
Schail court held that the drug testing program did not violate the student
athletes' fourth amendment rights.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Tip-
pecanoe County School random drug testing policy.2 69 The Schaill II court
acknowledged that the prospective searches of these high school athletes
were to take place not only without a probable cause or a warrant, but also
in the absence of any individualized suspicion of drug use by the students
tested.270 Following the lead of the T.L.O. decision, the Schaill II court
stated that the suspicionless searches of random student-athletes for drugs
are permissible:
[I]nterscholastic athletes have diminished expectations of privacy,
and have voluntarily chosen to participate in an activity which sub-
jects them to pervasive regulation of off-campus behavior; the
school's interest in preserving a drug-free athletic program is sub-
stantial, and cannot adequately be furthered by less intrusive means;
the [drug-testing] program adequately limits the discretion of the of-
ficials performing the search; and the information sought is intended
264. Id.
265. Id. at 852.
266. Id. at 856.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 856-57.
269. See Schail v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
270. d at 1315.
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to be used solely for noncriminal education and rehabilitative
purposes.271
The Schaill cases may be a harbinger of drastic changes in the testing of
high school athletes for drugs. However, the Schaill opinions should be
restricted to situations involving the random testing of student athletes for
steroids and should not permit blanket random testing of student athletes
for any and all drugs.272 As several studies have indicated, as a group, ath-
letes are no more likely than the general student population to use "social
drugs" such as alcohol, marijuana, hashish, cocaine or psychadelics; how-
ever, athletes are more likely to use steroids.2 73 Therefore, absent reasonable
suspicion, school officials and administrative personnel should only be able
to test high school athletes, or any athlete, for anabolic steroids but not for
street drugs.274
b. Collegiate Drug Testing
Although the implementation of NCAA rules by a university has been
held not to be state action,2 75 this section will cover situations, like in Cali-
fornia, where a state constitution or statute provides that the doctrine of
state action is not applicable to private institutions.27 6 This would make
private entities, like the NCAA, amenable to constitutional challenges.
This section will propose a solution to the constitutional prohibitions so
that the NCAA can randomly test athletes.
(1) Reasonable Suspicion
In the context of college or university students, the Supreme Court has
not articulated any special standard for fourth amendment analysis. The
constitutionality of any drug testing procedure will be scrutinized under the
same standards as public sector employees that are tested. Federal courts
are split on whether the testing of employees absent "reasonable suspicion"
is a violation of the fourth amendment.277
271. Id at 1322.
272. See infra notes 286-97 and accompanying text.
273. Schaill, 679 F. Supp. at 856-57.
274. See infra notes 286-97 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 197-204.
276. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
277. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1545 (6th Cir. 1988) and the cases cited
therein. However, in Skinner, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989) and Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989), the
Court held that public employees can be tested for drugs absent reasonable suspicion.
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In O'Halloran v. University of Washington,278 a student athlete sought
an injunction against the enforcement of the NCAA drug testing procedure,
stating that the testing, absent reasonable suspicion, violated the fourth
amendment and the student athlete's reasonable expectation of privacy.279
The O'Halloran court, relying on the T.L.O. standards, asserted that the
testing would be justified at the inception if there were "reasonable grounds
for believing that urine tests of student-athletes will turn up evidence of
misconduct."'28 The court held that "past incidents of improper drug use
by athletes' 281 within the nationwide athletic population, taken in conjunc-
tion with the university's efforts to deter drug abuse among its student ath-
letes, gave the university reasonable grounds for testing.282
The O'Halloran court came to the right conclusion, but it was not per-
suasive in its logic. There is no indication that the T.L.O. holding, which
lowers the reasonable suspicion standard for high school students, can be
extended to college students. As Justice Powell's concurring opinion in
T.L.O. articulates, the public high school setting presents a unique bond
between the student and teacher:
The special relationship between teacher and student also distin-
guishes the setting within which school children operate ....
[T]here is a commonality of interests between teachers and their
pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal respon-
sibility for the student's welfare as well as for his education.
28 3
Other courts284 and commentators 2 5 have noted that there is a distinc-
tion between the college and high school contexts and that they should not
be treated similarly. The special relationship that develops in the smaller
high school classroom setting cannot be transposed into the collegiate class-
rooms where hundreds of students sit in on a lecture, and student-professor
interreaction is virtually non-existent. The commonality of interests and
the feelings of personal responsibility for the students' welfare articulated
by the T.L. 0. Court are not present at the collegiate level. The standard of
reasonable suspicion gave the O'Halloran court problems, and in the con-
text of steroid testing, it would be troublesome for any court.
278. 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash. 1988), rev'd on procedural grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th
Cir. 1988).
279. Id. at 1002-04.
280. Id. at 1004.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. 469 U.S. at 349-50.
284. See Schaill, 679 F. Supp. at 849.
285. See, eg., 4 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 10.11(c), at 181, n.86.
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As noted earlier, courts have generally required that the state possess a
reasonable suspicion that a particular employee was under the influence of
drugs prior to testing.2" 6 The problem with the reasonable suspicion stan-
dard in the context of anabolic steroid testing is that steroids do not mani-
fest any outward symptoms like street drugs.287 In Capua v. City of
Plainfield,28 the District Court of New Jersey correctly articulated that in
testing for street drugs, the reasonable suspicion standard should govern.2"9
"[O]ne so under the influence of drugs as to impair the performance of his
or her duties must manifest some outward symptoms which, in turn, would
give rise to a reasonable suspicion.""29
Unlike street drugs, steroid use is not typically accompanied by charac-
teristic signals that give rise to an articulable basis for suspecting drug
use.2 Steroid use is not easily recognized by physical characteristics like
slurred speech, red or glassy eyes, problems with equilibrium or other as-
pects of motor coordination like street drugs.29
As Professor Dugal, a member of the International Olympic Committee
Medical Commission, stated, it is a "practical impossibility to detect by
observation alone the use of anabolic steroids." '293 Although there are cer-
tain side effects, they are not common to all athletes, and much depends
upon the dosage.294
In the context of steroids, the reasonable suspicion standard would be
unworkable.2 95 Would the reasonable suspicion arise when an athlete sets a
286. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
287. See infra notes 291-92, 295 and accompanying text.
288. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D. N.J. 1986).
289. Id. at 1517-18.
290. Id. at 1518.
291. See Note, Shoemaker v. Handel and Urinalysis Drug Testing: Looking for an American
Standard, 21 GA. L. REv. 467,484 (1987) ("drug... use is typically accompanied by characteris-
tic signals that give rise to an articulable basis for suspecting such conduct. Substance abuse is
generally identifiable by erratic behavior, distinctive odors, and certain paraphernalia associated
with drug use.").
292. See Note, Dragnet Drug Testing in Public Schools and the Fourth Amendment, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 852, 872-73 (1986) ("A child under the influence of drugs exhibits familiar and
easily recognizable physical characteristics; slurred speech, red or glossy eyes, problems with equi-
librium and other gross motor coordination, drowsiness or excessive rowdiness, and, with some
narcotics, a distinctive odor.").
293. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1007.
294. See Bergman & Leach, supra note 5.
295. Unlike street drugs, anabolic steroids enhance an individual's performance; they do not
adversely affect it. Steroids are practically impossible to detect by observation alone. See supra
note 293-94. Therefore, although the reasonable suspicion standard might be appropriate in test-
ing for street drugs, when outward symptoms may appear, the standard is unworkable in situa-
tions involving the use of anabolic steroids. The ingestion of steroids does not mean that that
individual will suddenly develop bulging biceps and rippling pectorals that would give rise to
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world record, or runs for two hundred yards in a football game, or perhaps
hits forty home runs and steals forty bases in a single baseball season?296 Or
perhaps reasonable suspicion would arise when an individual substantially
surpasses his or her previous best performance, like long jumper Bob Bea-
mon or baseball player Roger Maris.297 Maybe athletes like Steffi Graf,
Eric Dickerson and Greg Louganis should be tested because they are too
good in their respective sports. Unlike street drugs, where the standard of
reasonable suspicion should govern, anabolic steroids present a unique and
difficult problem; therefore, testing for anabolic steroids cannot be subjected
to the reasonable suspicion standard.
(2) The "Highly Regulated Industry" Exception to Reasonable
Suspicion and the Shoemaker Extension
An exception to the reasonable suspicion standard has been recognized
in industries that are pervasively regulated.29 The Court has recognized
that in order to ensure compliance with a regulatory scheme, the govern-
ment may undertake inspections of the premises occupied by those highly
regulated industries without a warrant and without any degree of individu-
reasonable suspicion. Athletes not requiring hulking muscles also use steroids. Cyclists,
marathoners, and even bobsledders are now using steroids. Archers, pistol and rifle shooters, and
pentathletes use propanolol and other beta blockers to slow their heart rate down, so the athlete
can be more steady in his or her aim. See Altman, For New Specialists In Drug Detection, Athletes
Set Fast Pace, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1988, at C-3, col 3. Robert Voy, head of the U.S. Olympic
Committee sports program stated: "They're [steroids] used in almost every sport now." See The
Growing Threat of Steroids, Boston Globe, Nov. 1, 1988, at 77.
296. After the detection of Ben Johnson's steroid use, the world record breaking perform-
ances of other athletes were tarnished by unfounded accusations of steroid use. American female
track stars Florence Griffith Joyner and Jackie Joyner-Kersee were targets of such accusations
after they set new world records. See Axthelm, supra note 14, at 56. After Jose Canseco of the
Oakland Athletics became the first baseball player in history to hit 40 homeruns and steal 40 bases
in the same season, there were allegations that Canseco achieved these feats through the aid of
anabolic steroids. See, eg., Downey, Oakland Strong Men Have More Muscle Than Bulgarian
Weightlifters, L.A. Times, Oct. 9, 1988, at Sports-6, col. 1.
297. In the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games, Bob Beamon jumped 29 feet, 2-1/2 inches in
the long jump to set a world record that advanced the previous world record of Igor Ter-
Ovanesyan by more than 21 inches and that still stands today. To many, it was one of the greatest
athletic feats of all-time. Yet, Beamon never jumped beyond 27 feet either before or after his feat
in the Olympics. Roger Maxis, a baseball player for the New York Yankees hit 61 home runs in
1961. The 61 home runs is still a major league record, yet in no other season did Maris hit more
than 40 home runs. It would be ludicrous to suggest that Beamon, Maxis or scores or other
athletes used steroids, yet they recorded feats that are beyond explanation. They excelled in their
sports through innate athletic ability, not clandestine chemistry.
298. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (warrantless administrative search of
commercial property pursuant to federal statute is proper if inspection necessary to ensure law is
properly enforced).
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alized suspicion.299 The Court's rationale is that the institution of a regula-
tory scheme and the existence of the federal regulatory program in and of
itself diminishes the reasonable expectation of privacy of those involved in
the industry. 3"°
In Shoemaker v. Handel,a"' the District Court for the District of New
Jersey extended the "highly regulated industry" exception of the reasonable
suspicion standard so as to include not just the search of the premises, but
also the search of persons.30 2 Shoemaker involved a challenge to the regula-
tions of the New Jersey Racing Commission requiring jockeys to submit to
random urine testing. 33 The jockeys contended that these regulations vio-
lated their constitutional rights.3a 4
The court upheld the testing program, absent reasonable suspicion, stat-
ing that the jockeys voluntarily participated in horse racing, which is a
unique industry subject to pervasive and continuous regulation by the
state.30 5 Jockeys are licensed by the state and have received ample notice of
the regulations, and therefore they must accept the unique benefits and bur-
dens of their trade. Among these burdens is the submission to inspections
intended to further legitimate state interests in ensuring that horse races are
safely and honestly run and that the public perceives them as S0. 306
The Third Circuit, in Shoemaker 11,307 affirmed the district court's ex-
tension of the doctrine but emphasized that the "holding applies only to...
urine sampling of voluntary participants in a highly-regulated industry. '30 8
The Shoemaker II court also stated that there are two interrelated require-
ments justifying the warrantless administrative search exception. First, the
299. Id. at 598-600.
300. Id. at 600.
301. 608 F. Supp. 1151 (D. N.J. 1985).
302. At its inception, the administrative search was limited only to searches of the premises.
In Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court emphasized that the administrative
search was "neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of [a] crime, they
involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy." Id. at 537.
303. Shoemaker, 608 F. Supp. at 1159.
304. Id. at 1155. The jockeys argued that the regulations violated their fourth, fifth and ninth
amendment rights, and the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment.
305. Id. at 1156.
306. Id. at 1157-58.
307. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986). The Shoemaker H court recognized that its holding
would be an extension of the exception: "[Tlhe question that arises in this case is whether the
administrative search exception extends to the warrantless testing of persons engaged in the regu-
lated activity." Id. at 1142.
308. Id. at 1142 n.5.
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state must have a strong interest in conducting an unannounced search.3"9
Second, the pervasive regulations of the industry must have reduced the
justifiable expectations of privacy of those individuals being tested.31°
Examining the first prong of the Shoemaker II test, there are three state
interests implicated in conducting unannounced searches of athletes for an-
abolic steroids. First, like Shoemaker II, the health and safety of the ath-
letes using the steroids is an obvious concern. The medical literature has
increased the evidence of the adverse effects of steroids.31 Further, ana-
bolic steroids affect not only the users, but the health and safety of those
players not using steroids is also implicated.31 2
Second, protecting the integrity of the game is essential to society. Cer-
tainly the forces that influence society will influence professional sports;
however, young athletes do not idolize and emulate the behavior of the gen-
eral population. Compounding the problem of drug abuse in athletics is
that our youth see it and often imitate it. The elimination of steroids from
sports will not only help the individual participants engaged in competition,
but it will also strengthen the public's confidence in athletics.
Third, an unannounced search of randomly selected athletes is the only
legitimate means to establish an effective steroid testing program. Present
testing procedures do not deter steroid use.31 3 Many athletes ingest steroids
as close as a week prior to the testing dates without detection. 314 The rea-
sonable suspicion standard is unworkable since there are no outward symp-
toms that would signal the use of steroids.315 If the "lower" standard of
reasonable suspicion cannot be satisfied, the burden of showing probable
cause also would be unattainable. The warrantless administrative search ex-
ception is the only means of effectively deterring athletes from ingesting
steroids.
309. Id. at 1142. In justifying the extension of the exception, the Shoemaker H court stated:
"[W]hile there are distinctions between searches of persons, in the intensely-regulated field of
horse racing, where the persons engaged in the regulatory activity are the principal regulatory
concern, these distinctions are not so significant that warrantless testing for alcohol and drug use
can be said to be constitutionally unreasonable." Id.
310. Id.; see also Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n of N.J. v. Washington Tp., 850 F.2d 133, 136
(3d Cir. 1988) (application of the Shoemaker I test).
311. See supra notes 87-106 and accompanying text.
312. See infra notes 397-98 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 82.
315. See supra notes 291-94 and accompanying text.
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In United States v. Biswell,a16 the Court upheld a federal agent's war-
rantless search of a licensed gun dealer's storeroom. The Court held that
the warrantless inspection did not violate the fourth amendment, stating:
Federal regulation of the interstate traffic in firearms is not deeply
rooted in history... but close scrutiny of this traffic is undeniably of
central importance to federal efforts to prevent violent crime and to
assist the state in regulating the firearms traffic within their
borders.317
The Biswell Court further stated that "if inspection is to be effective and
serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent inspections are
essential. In this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate
inspection." '318 Testing athletes for steroids, like the search in Biswell,
would be ineffective if a warrant or reasonable suspicion were required.
Assuming that the "state interest" aspect of the Shoemaker II test is
met, the second hurdle of the test involves the individual's justifiable expec-
tations of privacy being reduced because of the pervasive regulations of the
industry.31 9
There is no field that so pervasively and objectively reduces one's expec-
tations of privacy as athletics. In athletics, an individual's expectations of
privacy are substantially lower than that of the general population. Most, if
not all, varsity programs require the administration of a physical exam
prior to the athlete obtaining approval to compete in extracurricular sports.
The purpose of this testing is not to invade the student's privacy, but to
determine the relative health and ensure the safety of the individual prior to
participation in strenuous athletic activities. The male physical exam is a
very intrusive one, and certain aspects of the exam involve the physician
actually touching the male genitals. The female exam is equally as intrusive
and involves the physician touching the female's breasts and vaginal area.
No other school activity involves or would permit the actual physical intru-
sion upon an individual's body.
The privacy expectations are further lowered by the day-to-day interac-
tion between athletes in communal showers and dressing rooms. Physical
exams and the communal conditions are not imposed upon the general stu-
dent population, yet athletes voluntarily choose to accept them. By electing
to participate in the sports programs, the athlete has chosen a less private
atmosphere in which to live.
316. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
317. Id. at 315.
318. Id. at 316.
319. See supra note 310.
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Although the NCAA is highly regulated and the athletes may have a
reduced expectation of privacy due to the regulations, the NCAA is not an
industry. Biswell and the other administrative search exception cases all
involved the regulation of industries.
National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab,32 involved a union
bringing an action challenging the constitutionality of the Customs Service
requiring urine testing for drug use in certain sensitive jobs. The Fifth Cir-
cuit recognized that this testing program did not involve a highly regulated
industry, yet, by analogy, it invoked the administrative search exception:
[The Custom Service regulations] call for the same kind of balance
between the need for the search and the invasion of the individual's
expectation of privacy. Individuals seeking employment in drug in-
terception know that inquiry may be made concerning their off-the-
job use of drugs and that the tolerance usually extended for private
activities does not extend to them if investigation discloses their use
of drugs.321
The NCAA regulations are also analogous to those in the highly regu-
lated industry exceptions. The athletes know, prior to joining a sports
team, that they could and will be tested for drugs pursuant to the NCAA
regulations. And like Shoemaker II, the athletes are the principal concern
of the NCAA regulations.
(2) The NCAA: Regulating the "Industry" Of Intercollegiate Athletics
The violence began in the late nineteenth century. Football was a game
with few rules and without direction. The Boston Post called it the "most
atrociously brutal game through-out. ' 322 By 1903, there were not only
journalistic complaints, but the legislature protested as well. 323 Several
states sought through the legislature to outlaw college football.324 This pro-
duced a few rule changes, but the 1905 football season was plagued with
eighteen deaths and one hundred forty-nine serious injuries attributed to
college football.325 James Roscoe Day, the Chancellor of Syracuse Univer-
320. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987) aff'd in part 485 U.S. 903 (1989) (The Court affirmed the
suspicionless drug-testing of employees applying for promotion to positions involving interdiction
of illegal drugs or requiring them to carry firearms).
321. Id. at 180.
322. See 3. FALLA, NCAA: THE VOICE OF COLLEGE SPORTS 12 (1981).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 13. Critics were not only in the newspapers and state senates, but also in the
theaters. In 1905, one of the great theatrical successes of the season was "The College Widow," a
black satire about the violence in college football. Id.
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sity, stated: "One human life is too big a price for all the games of the
season."
326
Public pressure and common sense dictated that regulation was needed.
On October 9, 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt brought the seriousness
of college football violence to national attention when he called a special
White House conference and summoned the various football leaders.
327
On December 28, 1905, under the direction of Captain Palmer E. Post of
West Point, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States
(IAAUS) was organized.328 However, in the 1909 season, thirty-three col-
lege football players were killed, demonstrating that even more stringent
rules were needed.329
By 1912, the IAAUS would be renamed the National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association, and in the words of Captain Post, it would be: "the voice
of college sports. ' 330 The ideals of the NCAA founders transcended the
game itself, for the NCAA was founded not only to regulate the rules of the
game, but also the conduct of those who played the game.
One of the first actions taken by the NCAA Football Rules Committee
was the adoption of a code of ethics, which stated:
[T]he first obligation of every football player is to protect the game
itself, its reputation and its good name. He owes this to the game, its
friends and traditions. There can be little excuse for any player who
allows the game to be smirched with unsportsmanlike tactics.
331
From its inception more than eighty years ago, the NCAA regulations
focused on two primary objectives: safety and the integrity of the sport.
Although the initial roll-call has grown from sixty-two schools regulating
one sport, football, and now encompasses nearly one-thousand schools and
dozens of sports, the principles of the NCAA as a regulating body have not
changed: safety of the athletes and integrity of the game are the main
objectives.
The current NCAA Constitution, bylaws, and enforcement procedures
entail two hundred and fifty-two pages of rules and regulations as complex
326. Id
327. Id at 13. President Roosevelt gave the representatives two options-reform or abolish.
Roosevelt, himself a former varsity boxer for Harvard, made it clear he preferred reform. How-
ever, when the football committee met that December, they took no actions to reform the game.
Outraged, thirteen Eastern colleges decided to take it upon themselves to restructure the rules.
On December 28, 1905, 62 schools sent delegates to establish a new criteria for collegiate football.
Id at 13-14.
328. Id. at 14-15.
329. Id. at 43.
330. Id. at 15.
331. Id at 54.
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as any regulatory scheme. 332 These sections regulate the eligibility of ath-
letes, 333 academic standards, 334 principles of ethical conduct,335 scholarship
and financial aid requirements, 336 recruiting,337 squad and coaching limita-
tions, 338 disciplinary proceedings, 339 and sanctions for those who violate
these standards. 3 °
As the Arlosoroff court noted, the NCAA serves a regulating role:
[T]he NCAA may be said to perform a public function as the over-
seer of the nation's intercollegiate athletics. It introduces some or-
der into the conduct of its programs and enforces uniform rules of
eligibility.... The fact that [the] NCAA's regulatory function may
be of some public service lends no support to the finding of state
action, for the function is not one traditionally reserved to the
state.
341
In Shoemaker 11,342 the Third Circuit emphasized that the exception to
the reasonable suspicion standard applies only to the urine sampling of vol-
untary participants in a highly regulated industry.343 Collegiate athletes,
like jockeys, are voluntary participants in a highly regulated industry, inter-
collegiate athletics. The principal regulatory concern of the NCAA is the
NCAA athlete. Accordingly, the random testing of NCAA athletes, absent
any indicia of reasonable suspicion, should withstand any fourth anend-
ment constitutional challenges.
C. Random Testing and the Equal Protection Clause
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that
no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws."' 3 " Any claim under the equal protection clause is evalu-
ated by a court under one of two tests: (1) the "rational basis" standard3 45
332. See 1987-88 MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION (1987)
[hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
333. NCAA MANUAL, Constitution 3-9.
334. Id. at 3-3.
335. Id. at 3-6.
336. Id. at 3-4.
337. Id. at 3-5.
338. Id. at 3-10.
339. Id. Enforcement l(a)-12(f)(2).
340. Id.
341. 746 F.2d at 1021.
342. 795 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1986).
343. Id. at 1143 n.7.
344. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
345. See Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) ("The Warren Court embraced a
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or (2) the "strict scrutiny" standard.' The "strict scrutiny" standard is
used when the claimant can show that a fundamental right is at stake, or a
suspect class is placed at a disadvantage by the program.347
The participation in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics is not a
constitutionally protected fundamental right.34 Athletes do not make up a
"suspect class" that entails a categorization based upon race, nationality,
religion, alienage or gender. 9 Thus, the "strict scrutiny" standard can not
be applied to evaluate the constitutionality of a drug-testing program under
the fourteenth amendment.
Since the "strict scrutiny" standard is inapplicable, the equal protection
clause demands only that the school's drug testing program bear some ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate state purpose.350 This inquiry involves
two elements: (1) does the drug testing program have a legitimate purpose;
and (2) did the school officials reasonably believe that the use of the classifi-
cation would promote that purpose.351
In Shoemaker,"5 2 racehorse jockeys challenged the Racing Commis-
sion's mandatory random drug testing program under the equal protection
clause.3 53 The court, using the rational relationship test, held that subject-
ing jockeys to random drug testing was rational and furthered legitimate
safety interests of the state by reducing the possibility of accidents and
deaths among the jockeys while racing.354 As in Shoemaker, the concern
with drug testing in athletes is a health and safety concern of the individual
participants.
rigid two-tier attitude. Some situations evoked the aggressive 'new' equal protection with scrutiny
that was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the deferential 'old' equal protection
reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact.").
346. Id.
347. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973).
348. See, eg., Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258, 260 (6th Cir. 1987); Graham v. NCAA, 804
F.2d 953, 959 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Wichita State Univ., 698 F.2d 1082, 1086 (10th Cir.
1983); Hamilton v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 552 F.2d 681, 682 (6th Cir. 1976);
Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1034 (5th Cir. 1975); Schaill, 679 F. Supp. at 853; Barbay v.
NCAA, 1987 WL 5619 (E.D. La. 1987) (WESTLAW, Allfeds Database).
349. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1105.
350. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40. If a court finds a legitimate state objective that is ration-
ally related to the university's testing program, the court must give great deference to the state's
purpose. Id. See, e-g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
351. See Schaill, 679 F. Supp. at 854.
352. 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D. N.J. 1985).
353. Id. at 1105.
354. Id.
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In Schaill,355 a public high school student athlete challenged the
school's drug testing program on equal protection grounds.356 The student
athlete claimed that the drug testing procedure as a prerequisite to partici-
pation in the athletic program violated equal protection because non-ath-
letes engaged in activities as strenuous as athletes, yet were not required to
submit to drug testing.3 57 The Schail court stated that unlike other school
activities, "participation in interscholastic sports presents unique health or
safety risks for drug users. '35" The court rejected further the argument that
athletes were being singled out, stating that the drug testing is not com-
pelled upon the student athlete; it is their choice and if they do not want to
be subject to the testing procedure, "there remains with the [student ath-
lete] the option of not being an athlete and thereby avoiding the possible
testing.
35 9
As long as a testing procedure is uniform and applicable to all varsity
student athletes, it will withstand equal protection claims. Even a program
that is limited to particular sporting events, such as football or track and
field, could withstand equal protection challenges if the school could effec-
tively demonstrate that steroid use is more prevalent in those sports than in
other school sports programs. Any attempt by athletes to challenge the
legitimacy of the testing because it does not deal with steroid abuse among
the general student population also will fail. A court will not invalidate a
testing program solely because it only deals with part of the problem.3 "°
D. Random Testing and the Due Process Clause
No state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... ,,361 The fundamental touchstones of the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment are notice and fundamental fair-
ness. However, if a "life, liberty, or property" interest is not at stake, no
process is required at all.3 62
At the high school and collegiate level, student athletes have claimed
that they have a property interest in participating in interscholastic or inter-
355. 679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
356. Id. at 857.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 854.
360. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). It is perfectly
acceptable for a university or school to address a drug problem one step at a time. See, eg.,
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
361. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
362. See, eg., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972).
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collegiate athletics,363 and a liberty interest in freedom from the stigma that
would attach if suspended from athletics on the basis of a positive drug
test.3 Courts have denied such claims because participation in athletics
has been deemed a privilege and not a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution.365
In Schaill,366 the court rejected a high school athlete's claim that high
school athletics provide a vehicle to college through athletic scholarships,
and that deprivation of the right to compete in the high school athletic
program denied the claimant a property interest.367 The court stated that
although a student's aspirations for a college scholarship were admirable
and of understandable importance to the athlete, they "do not establish any
legally protected interests.
368
In Barbay v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,36" a collegiate foot-
ball player was banned from participating in the Sugar Bowl for testing
positive for steroids.370 The athlete claimed that his inability to display his
skills in the Sugar Bowl was an irreparable injury and had damaged his
reputation, in which he claimed to have a legitimate property interest.
371
The court rejected both claims and upheld the actions of both the NCAA
and the university.372
Even assuming that there was a legitimate protected interest involved,
the fourteenth amendment does not prohibit such deprivations where ade-
quate due process procedures are provided.3 73 The due process clause re-
quires that an individual be given notice and an opportunity to be heard
prior to the deprivation of a right. Any drug testing procedure must pro-
363. See, eg., Schaill, 679 F. Supp. 833 (high school athlete claimed property interest in
obtaining athletic scholarship to college); Barbay, 1987 WL 5619 (E.D. La. 1987) (collegiate ath-
lete claimed property interest in competing in Sugar Bowl).
364. See, eg., Schaill, 679 F. Supp. 833; Barbay, 1987 WL 5619.
365. See supra note 348. In Schaill II, the Seventh Circuit stated: "It is highly speculative to
assume that the reasons for a student's suspension from athletic competition will become general
knowledge, and that the student's reputation will be adversely affected by the suspension."
Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1323.
366. 679 F. Supp. 833.
367. Id. at 854-55.
368. Id. at 855.
369. 1987 WL 5619 (E.D. La. 1987) (WESTLAW, Allfeds Database).
370. Id. at 1.
371. Id. at 14-15.
372. Id. The court stated that not being able to play in a bowl game was not an irreparable
injury, since professional football scouts do not predicate their assessments solely on the basis of
post season competition. Even assuming arguendo that Barbay had a property interest in his repu-
tation, he had not shown that he was defamed or that his reputation was damaged.
373. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1984); see also Schaill, 679 F.
Supp. at 853.
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vide a comprehensive outline of the exact conduct that is prohibited so that
the athlete will have fair notice and warning of the conduct that invokes
disciplinary action. Prior to being disciplined, the athletes must be given
notice of the charges against them, and they must be provided with an op-
portunity to challenge the test results or to refute the charges.374
E. Random Testing and the Right of Privacy
The Constitution does not provide any explicit passages guaranteeing
individuals the right to personal privacy. In the seminal case of Griswald v.
Connecticut,37 5 the Supreme Court, by judicial fiat, recognized that there
exists a right of privacy and that there also exists certain "zones of
privacy. '376 As later noted by the Court in Roe v. Wade,377 the right of
privacy only extends to those rights deemed by the Court to be "fundamen-
tal' 371 or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
'3 79
Although not specifically guaranteed, the Court recognizes two types of
privacy interests: (1) the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters;380 and (2) the interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions.381 The latter decisions generally involve inter-
ests particular to family or child rearing.382 The drug testing of athletes
374. The Tippecanoe County School Corporation (TSC) sets forth excellent guidelines for
any drug testing program. If a student is randomly selected, the athletic director will inform the
student and his or her parent or guardian of positive test result. The tests are confirmed by a gas
chromotography/mass spectrometry, which produce results with a 95% confidence level. The
student and parent or guardian will also have the opportunity to offer evidence to the athletic
director that may explain or exonerate the student. The athletic director may then consult with a
toxicologist to determine whether the student's explanation could account for a positive result. As
stated by the Schaill II court: "[T"he TSC policy provides the student with notice of the charges
against him or her, and an opportunity to rebut the charges at a meeting with the school-discipli-
nary authority." Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1323.
375. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
376. The Griswald "zone of privacy" was created by the Court bringing together the first,
fourth, fifth and ninth amendments of the Constitution. These rights have "penumbras, formed
by eminations from those guarantees which give life to the right of privacy." Griswold, 381 U.S. at
484.
377. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
378. Id. at 118 (quoting with approval Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
379. Id.
380. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
381. Id.
382. See, eg., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (the right to educate one's child
as one chooses); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (the right to study German in a private
school). As stated by Justice McReynolds, "liberty" encompasses "not merely freedom from bod-
ily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and bring up chil-
dren, to worship according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
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would fall into the former, the right of privacy in not disseminating the
contents of one's body.3
3
The right of privacy is not absolute; governmental intrusion is permissi-
ble and must be balanced against important state interests.384 In Roe, the
Court recognized a state's interest in safeguarding public safety and welfare
as legitimate.3 8
5
In Schaill,3 6 two prospective high school varsity athletes claimed that
the collection of urine testing samples violated their privacy rights.38 7 The
Schaill court began its analysis by recognizing that there were legitimate
privacy interests involved in monitoring urination, even if the monitoring is
non-visual.388 However, the court held that the surrounding circumstances
particular to athletics reduced the athletes' legitimate expectation of
privacy:
The student athlete, along with the choice of participating in inter-
scholastic sports, embraces certain customs, activities, and values
that are unique to the athletic environment. Physical interaction
among athletes is generally more commonplace among student ath-
letes than among students in the general population, as exemplified
by repeated and frequent use of communal showers and dressing
rooms, the requirement of a yearly physical and in some instances,
by the actual physical contact that is part of the sports activity.
These factors, again, in and of themselves are not determinative, nor
do they serve the purpose of negating privacy expectations.
3 9
These reduced expectations taken in conjunction with the important state
interest of maintaining a drug-free athletic program and concerns for the
health and safety of the athletic participants outweighed the students' pri-
vacy interests.3 °
In deciding the privacy issue, the Schaill court also was impressed with
two other factors: the non-observation policy of collecting the urine sam-
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men." Id. at 399. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (the right to procreation); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (the right to activities relating to marriage); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (the right to use contraception).
383. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
384. See, eg., Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602; Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
385. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
386. Schaill, 679 F. Supp. 833.
387. Id. at 856-57.
388. Id. at 857.
389. Id. at 856.
390. Id.
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ples391 and the provision that no student athlete who tested positive would
be disciplined in any way academically, nor could the tests result in suspen-
sion or expulsion of any student athletes. 392 These measures insured as
much privacy to the student athlete without compromising the integrity of
the testing procedure and punished the athlete only for his extra-extracur-
ricular activities without impinging on the educational process.
Although personal autonomy and rights of privacy are laudable and es-
sential axioms, when an individual's conduct interferes with another's per-
sonal autonomy, an absolute freedom can no longer be recognized by
society. As the English philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill once
stated: "[Ihe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. ' 3 93 "As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prej-
udicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it."' 394 An indi-
vidual cannot have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy when
his or her conduct adversely effects the rights of others. 395
The use of anabolic steroids involves not only the health and safety of
the individual player using the drug, but it also affects the safety of the
other individuals on the playing field not using the drug.3 96 Anabolic ster-
oids are performance enhancers; they develop bigger, stronger and faster
athletes.
Indirectly, athletes not using steroids are placed at a competitive disad-
vantage. To retain their starting position or even to just make the team,
these athletes are forced to become steroid users. As Dr. Charles Yeslis,
Professor of Health Policy and Administration at Penn State University,
said: "Clearly steroids give you an advantage over people who aren't taking
391. Schaill, 679 F. Supp. at 857. The testing procedure provided that the student selected
for the testing is accompanied by a school official of the same sex into the bathroom. The student
is provided with an empty specimen bottle and allowed to enter a lavatory stall and close the door
in order to produce the sample. At no time is the student under direct visual observation while
producing the sample; however, the integrity of the exam is not compromised by the non-observa-
tion policy. A dye is added to the toilet bowl to prevent diluting the sample, and the general
temperature of the sample is noted upon collection to prevent the athlete bringing in another's
urine. Further, a chain of custody of the samples is designed to insure the accuracy and anonymity
of the testing procedure. Schaill 11, 864 F.2d at 1311.
392. Id. at 858.
393. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 68-69 (1984).
394. Id. at 141.
395. See, eg., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 1372-73 (1988) ("The intui-
tion that one's safety is wholly one's own business is simply too far out of phase with the reality of
our interdependent society to find any plausible expression in our constitutional order.").
396. See infra notes 397-98.
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them." '397 Dr. Charles Brown, the past president of the NFL Physicians'
Society, stated that when some players use steroids and others do not, the
"competition at that level is no longer equal." '3 9 8
Directly, steroids enhance an athlete's ability to accelerate at greater
speeds while retaining more muscle mass. Particularly in a sport like foot-
ball, as Einstein's most rudimentary principles exemplify, this will result in
a more forceful and powerful collision than could be generated absent ster-
oids. Those not armed with steroids are prone to sustain more injuries. As
one NFL linebacker articulated:
Steroids are the worst problem in the NFL. I just want to play foot-
ball with the body the Lord gave me. Some of these guys we play
are nothing but muscle. When you get hit by them, something has
to go.39
9
If a person smoked cigarettes all day in their own house, without inter-
fering with the rights of others, no judicial power should be exercised over
them to enjoin their activity. However, once they take that cigarette into
the public domain and prejudicially affect the rights of others, judicial au-
thority can and should be exercised over that activity. When steroids are
on the playing fields or in the athletic arenas, they have entered the public
domain, and no legitimate expectation of privacy can exist when others'
rights are adversely affected.
V. PROPOSED RANDOM DRUG TESTING PROGRAM
FOR ATHLETES
In order to decrease their availability to the public, anabolic steroids
and their synthetic derivatives must be reclassified by Congress as a con-
trolled substance. This would impose tighter controls on their manufacture
and their distribution by licensed physicians, and could expose dealers to
prison terms of up to twenty years and fines of up to $250,000 for each
count. States also can enact legislation prohibiting a physician from pre-
scribing anabolic steroids for the purpose of athletic enhancement.4°°
397. See Rhoden, supra note 65; see also Cooper, Athletes are Losers by Winning With Illegal
Drugs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1985, at Sports-2, col. 1. "Attempting to discourage the use of ana-
bolic-androgic steroids is a very difficult task, the main reason being that the athletes and many
coaches think that they must take them to compete with other athletes they know are taking
them. Many athletes feel compelled to experiment with the anabolic-androgic steroids whether or
not they like the idea of their use." Id.
398. Id
399. See Zimmerman, The Agony Must End, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 10, 1986, at 16.
400. Currently, in Indiana it is a felony for a physician to prescribe anabolic steroids for the
purpose of enhancing athletic performance. Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas and Virginia have enacted legislation aimed at the
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Internally, there 'must be strict sanctions levied against those who aid
and abet the athlete in obtaining and using steroids. Any doctor, coach or
trainer who makes these drugs available to the athlete should, in addition to
any criminal sanctions, be forever banned from associating again within
that sport.
Realistically, these proposals will only have a slight impact on the
amount of drugs available. Only by decreasing the demand for these drugs
will there ever be an effect on the black market. As long as there is a de-
mand, the black market will flourish. To stop this demand requires a three-
step solution: (1) random mandatory testing must be instituted at the pro-
fessional and collegiate levels; (2) there must be more severe sanctions
against those who are caught using performance enhancing drugs; and (3)
athletes must be educated on the adverse effects of steroids.
To more accurately gauge those involved with performance enhancing
drugs, random testing must be instituted. Athletes must be tested not only
at competition time but randomly during their training periods. Currently,
all athletes at all levels know exactly when their testing is to take place and
for which the drugs that they will be tested. Accordingly, they schedule
their drug intake during their training periods to maximize benefits and to
minimize detection.4" The only way that testing for performance enhanc-
ing drugs is to have any effectiveness is to make random testing mandatory
throughout the year.
Once the testing program is instituted, the system must allow the athlete
with a steroid problem to come forward voluntarily and to submit him or
herself to treatment without a sanction. For those who do not volunteer
themselves for treatment, there must be a serious disincentive to prevent the
use of steroids. This entails stricter penalties for the athletes caught using
performance enhancing drugs. If an athlete tests positive for anabolic ster-
oids, or for any synthetic derivative, they should be suspended from compe-
tition for one-quarter of their season, and they should be required to submit
to an education and rehabilitation program to be eligible to reenter the
league. The second offense should bring a one year suspension, and they
should again be required to submit themselves to a longer educational and
rehabilitation program. A third offense would result in a player's uncondi-
tional expulsion from the sport.
distribution and possession of steroids. Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York
and Pennsylvania have similar bills pending in the legislatures. See Letters, More Steroids, SPoRTS
ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 5, 1988, at 9.
401. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
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However, the initiation of any steroid testing program will not eliminate
those determined to obtain an advantage. Many synthetic derivatives are
presently being used by the athletes, and many of these are undetectable in
testing.' 2 To prevent this situation, the testing program must list all sub-
stances that are banned from competition, including those not presently
traceable through testing. Prior to each season the athlete must sign a
statement that they have not and will not use any of the listed banned sub-
stances. When the testing becomes sophisticated enough to detect these
synthetic drugs, and if the athlete tests positive, absent a viable medical
explanation, they will be suspended.
At the NCAA and professional level, these tests must be linked together
to provide a more effective deterrent. If a player tests positive in college or
at the international level, the player will have one strike against him. For
example, any team bidding for the services of Ben Johnson would be taking
him with one infraction. These infractions would then carry over into any
other athletic arena the athlete entered.
The importance of education and rehabilitation cannot be overempha-
sized. Any drug testing program must be constructive, not simply punitive.
A drug testing program with only sanctions will not stop the problem; it
will only move it to a new arena, the streets. Reverse anorexia and chemi-
cal dependency are serious concerns and must be treated accordingly.
The danger and adverse effects of steroids must be addressed by our
educational systems prospectively, and not only after a problem has oc-
curred. In 1986 the California assembly passed the Steroid Education Act,
which is a step in combating the widespread use of anabolic steroids." 3 The
bill will provide for an educational program for students in junior and se-
nior high school on the negative aspects of steroids.' The NCAA must
enact similar programs for its collegiate athletes and make participation a
mandatory prerequisite for incoming freshmen.
402. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
403. Title 2, ch. 253, § 51262 (1986) provides: "The Legislature hereby finds and declares
that the use of anabolic steroids to expedite the physical development and to enhance the perform-
ance level of secondary school athletes presents a serious health hazard to these student athletes.
It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this measure that, beginning with the 1987-88 school
year, schools be encouraged to include in instruction in grades 7 to 12, inclusive, in science,
health, drug abuse, or physical education programs a lesson on the effects of the use of anabolic
steroids. In order to increase the knowledge of students about the effects of the use of anabolic
steroids, the Superintendent of Public Instruction shall develop a steroid education package con-
sisting of teacher lesson plans, student pamphlets, parent pamphlets and video tapes to be distrib-
uted directly to school districts." (Added by Stats., 1986, c. 253, § 1).
404. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The exposure of Ben Johnson can be classified only as a victory if the
governing bodies of all sports realize the severity of the anabolic steroids
problem in athletics. Present testing procedures of the NCAA and the NFL
are ineffective and in need of much revision. The present NCAA bylaws
prohibiting steroid use do not affect the vast majority of the athletes, and
those who do participate in a bowl game or championship event can easily
stop or mask their steroid intake prior to testing. The NFL's hypocritical,
see-no-evil attitude has become a tacit endorsement for steroid use.
Random testing of our NCAA and professional athletes for steroids is a
harsh principle for many to accept, yet it is a needed remedy. To state that
this proposal does not care, or that it neglects the rights of athletes is mis-
guided. The safety and well being of the athletes beyond the game itself is
the motivation for this proposal. Random testing can be thought of as a
civil liberties issue or as a way of protecting those in a high risk business.
The individual rights and liberties of the Constitution are precious, but the
millions of athletes that are confronted with steroid use everyday are even
more precious. Too many athletes are making the wrong decision, and it is
time to take the decision out of their hands. It is time to return athletics to
a battle between who is the better athlete, and not a battle between who has
the better chemist.
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